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Chapter 1
Introduction
Associations between biological entities are ubiquitous in nature (Herre et al.,
1999). Some are maintained over long evolutionary time-spans, such as the al-
liances of genes on chromosomes, eucaryotic genomes and mitochondria, cells
in multicellular organisms, or of the members of animal societies. Other as-
sociations are of more transient nature. These include reproducing pairs of
animals, horizontally transmitted parasites and their hosts, or predators and
their prey.
The coalescence of formerly independent units into associations creates the
opportunity for co-operation but also conflict. Co-operation occurs whenever
a member of a group acts so as to increase the productivity and survival of
the group as a whole. Co-operation can be associated with division of labour
whereby group members specialise in the tasks they perform (Maynard Smith
and Szathmary, 1995; Queller, 2000). Different tissues of a metazoan body, for
example, fulfill different functions. Analogously, the different tasks in a social
insect colony are often performed by individuals of different castes which can
have differentiated morphologically. However, in most cases biological alliances
also involve conflict, because the interests of all group members do not com-
pletely coincide. Selfish strategies can occur that increase individual fitness
at the expense of the fitness of other group members (Leigh, 1977; Queller,
2000; Herre et al., 1999). The example of parasites and their hosts demon-
strates this very well: strategies that increase parasite reproduction often have
deleterious effects on host fitness. Inversely, a more efficient immuno-response
will benefit the host’s fitness but diminish that of the parasite whose survival
and/or reproduction are decreased.
Co-operative and antagonistic strategies are selected at different hierar-
chical levels. Selection at the level of the association as a whole favours in-
creased overall productivity and therefore bolsters co-operation. Selection
within groups, on the other hand, is concerned solely with the fitness of indi-
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vidual group members and favours strategies that increase individual success,
even if it is achieved against the interests of other group members. Whether it
is co-operation or conflict that dominates the interactions between the mem-
bers of an association thus depends on the relative strength of higher- and
lower level selection. Two situations where selection at the higher level is very
important are groups of closely related individuals and associations between
vertically transmitted symbionts and their hosts. In both cases, individual
and group success are coupled and high degrees of co-operation can evolve. If
group members are genetically very similar, there is not much incentive for
individuals to promote their own genes at the expense of group-mates, because
these will share a great proportion of alleles. Selection will therefore tend to
favour co-operative strategies, unless the increase in productivity due to co-
operation results in increased competition among the offspring of the group
(Queller, 1992, 2000). Two examples of highly co-operative kin-groups are
the metazoan body and social insect colonies. In both, we observe division of
labour that involves even the reproductive tasks, accomplished by specialised
members of the group, the germ line of our body and queens and males in
social insects. In vertically transmitted symbionts, the coupling of fitness be-
tween group members results from the fact that symbionts can only attain
the offspring generation in association with host progeny. They are therefore
selected for a benign relationship with their hosts in order to assure an op-
timal reproduction of the latter. An example of such a positive association
are Buchnera, symbiont bacteria found in aphids. In this case, both partners
rely on the alliance, Buchnera benefit from the shelter and resources supplied
by their host, whereas the aphids depend on amino acids synthesised by their
symbionts (Douglas, 1996).
While genetic relatedness or coupled reproduction can favour the evolution
of elaborate co-operation, conflict often persists. This thesis investigates con-
flict in two animal associations, Hymenopteran societies and the association
of Wolbachia symbionts and their hosts. Social Hymenoptera are one of the
prime examples for co-operation in the animal kingdom. In their colonies,
reproduction is usually monopolised by one or several queens, while work-
ers forgo reproduction and perform tasks like nest-construction, foraging, and
brood care. Despite the apparent harmonious co-operation, Hymenopteran so-
cieties are also the scene of conflicts. The best studied of these is queen-worker
conflict over sex allocation. As first pointed out by Trivers and Hare (1976),
conflict results from relatedness asymmetries caused by the haplodiploid mech-
anism of sex determination. In haplodiploid species, females develop from fer-
3tilised diploid eggs, whereas males develop from unfertilised haploid eggs. As a
consequence, in a colony headed by one singly-mated queen, workers are three
times more related to female sexuals (their sisters, r = 0.75) than to male
sexuals (their brothers, r = 0.25). Reflecting this asymmetry in relatedness,
equilibrium sex allocation under worker control is female-biased, with three
times more resources being invested in new queens than in males. Queens, in
contrast, are equally related to sons and daughters and therefore favour an
even investment in the two sexes.
Since Trivers and Hare, the body of theory on queen-worker conflict over
sex allocation has grown considerably (Bourke and Franks, 1995; Crozier and
Pamilo, 1996). Notably, predictions of equilibrium sex allocation under queen
and worker control of investment have been generated for a wide range of
social and ecological contexts. However, apart from some exceptions, these
studies have concentrated on the within-colony level, investigating the opti-
mal selfish strategies of workers and queens. The effects of queen and worker
manipulation on the productivity of the colony as a whole were not taken into
account. The first part of this thesis attempts to fill this gap. Chapter 2
presents a very general model of optimal sex allocation under worker control
that includes costs of sex ratio manipulation. In order to control sex allocation,
workers have to adjust the egg sex ratio, controlled by the queen who chooses
whether to fertilise or not the eggs she lays. The manipulation of brood sex
ratio by workers is likely to incur some loss of resources and thereby affect
colony productivity. The evolution of sex allocation under worker control will
therefore be the result of selection on the within-colony level (mediated by
relatedness asymmetries) as well as on the between-colony level (mediated by
costs of sex ratio manipulation). Chapter 3 considers a specific mechanism of
sex ratio biasing, the manipulation of female cast. Because workers as well as
female sexuals develop from diploid eggs, workers can increase the investment
in females by raising more female brood as sexuals. The increased female
bias in sex allocation is associated with a reduction of the colony’s worker
force and thus imposes costs in terms of colony productivity. Chapter 3 in-
vestigates how the balance of the two opposed effects determines sex ratio
evolution. Whereas Chapter 2 concentrates only on worker behaviour, Chap-
ter 3 includes both players in the conflict, queens and workers. The model
explicitly considers selection acting on the two parties to gain control over
investment and explores the possible equilibrium where control is shared be-
tween queens and workers. Finally, I complete the analysis by considering
the evolutionary interests of the developing female larvae themselves which
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have the choice between the altruistic strategy of worker development and
the selfish one of becoming queens. Again, the evolution of larval strategies
are analysed in interaction with possible counter-manipulation by queens or
workers.
The second part of my thesis concentrates on the association between the
symbiont Wolbachia and its ant host Formica exsecta. Wolbachia are alpha-
proteobacteria that live in the cytosplasm of many arthropod species (Werren,
1997). In exactly the same way as mitochondria, they are transmitted verti-
cally from the mother to the offspring. On the basis of its vertical mode of
transmission, one would expectWolbachia to have benign or positive effects on
its host. This is true in the sense thatWolbachia seldom have significant effects
on the fertility of infected hosts. However, in the same way as hymenopteran
queens and workers, Wolbachia and their hosts disagree over the relative value
of male and female offspring of the host (Werren and O’Neill, 1997). Whereas
the host transmits genes equally through both sexes, males represent a dead
end for the maternally transmitted symbiont. Regularly, Wolbachia appear to
override the interests of their hosts. In many host species, the symbiont in-
duces drastic alterations of host reproductive physiology, all of which promote
the spread of Wolbachia infection at the expense of the transmission of host
genes through males. In many cases the production of male offspring is com-
pletely suppressed. In isopods, for example, Wolbachia has a feminising effect,
causing genetic males to develop into functional females (Rousset et al., 1992b;
Rigaud et al., 1991). In several species of parasitic wasps, Wolbachia induces
females to reproduce parthenogenetically, which equally results in all-female
broods (e.g. Stouthamer et al., 1993). In other species, such as ladybirds and
butterflies, Wolbachia causes the selective abortion of male offspring during
early development(Hurst et al., 1999). In hosts in which offspring compete
for resources, this will allow for increased survival of females. Alternatively
to influencing host sex allocation directly, Wolbachia can take advantage of
males as a means to impede reproduction of un-infected females (Caspari and
Watson, 1959; Turelli and Hoffmann, 1991). Sperm of infected males contains
factors that prevent egg development unless the egg contains Wolbachia. This
”cytoplasmic incompatibility” between infected males and un-infected females
gives an advantage to infected females, who can reproduce normally with any
male.
Given Wolbachia’s interest in biasing host reproduction towards females,
Chapter 4 attempts to relate variations in sex allocation between colonies to
variations in infection with Wolbachia. In populations of the ant Formica ex-
5secta, the sex ratio of sexuals produced by colonies is bimodally distributed.
Most colonies produce almost exclusively male sexuals, whereas a minority of
colonies produces sexuals of both sexes. The hypothesis tested in Chapter 4
is that female production is induced by Wolbachia symbionts. The prevalence
of infection is therefore expected to be higher in colonies that produce females
than in those specialising on males. This study is important in the wider con-
text of this thesis. First, it investigates possible points of conflict between host
and symbiont. If female-production was indeed found to be due to manipula-
tion of the host by Wolbachia, this would indicate that host and symbiont are
in disagreement over reproduction. Second, it could have implications for the
interpretation of sex ratios. Demonstrating the influence of endosymbionts on
sex allocation would suggest that the reasons for variations in sex allocation
have not always to be sought in the genetic structure of the ant colonies.
Finally, Chapter 5 investigates the association betweenWolbachia and host
mitochondria. A joint analysis of mitochondrial haplotype of hosts and the
Wolbachia strains they carry allows to verify the faithfulness of vertical sym-
biont transmission. Pure vertical transmission can be detected by a perfect
genetic linkage of host mitochondria and Wolbachia, which is disrupted by
horizontal symbiont transfer between mitochondrial host lineages (Hoffmann
and Turelli, 1997). Furthermore, investigating the linkage between host mito-
chondrial haplotypes and theWolbachia strains they carry is of special interest
in F. exsecta. The reason is that rates of female dispersal are extremely low in
this ant (Liautard and Keller, 2001). Consequently, mitochondrial genotypes
are strongly differentiated between ant populations. If Wolbachia was effec-
tively purely maternally transmitted this creates the interesting possibility of
symbionts showing a population genetic structure identical to that of the host.

Chapter 2
Levels of selection in hymenopteran
sex ratio conflict
The study described in this chapter has been conducted in collaboration with
Ken R. Helms and Laurent Keller. The manuscript is in preparation for sub-
mission to The American Naturalist.
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Introduction
Queen-worker conflict over sex allocation has been an important area of re-
search on social insects over the past 25 years. As first outlined by Trivers
and Hare (1976), queens and workers in a hymenopteran colony differ in their
optimal sex allocation. This difference is caused by relatedness asymmetries
arising from haplodiploidy, the hymenopteran system of sex allocation. In
haplodiploid species, females develop from fertilised (diploid) eggs whereas
males develop from unfertilised (haploid) eggs. As a consequence, in a colony
headed by one singly-mated queen, workers are three times more related to
female sexuals (their sisters, r=0.75) than to male sexuals (their brothers,
r=0.25). Corresponding to this asymmetry in relatedness, equilibrium sex
allocation under worker control is female-biased, with three times more re-
sources invested in females than in males. Queens, on the other hand, are
equally related to sons and daughters and therefore favour an even investment
in the two sexes.
Since Trivers and Hare, hymenopteran sex ratio theory has been greatly
developed. Predictions of optimal sex allocation under queen and worker con-
trol have been generated so as to include more complex genetic structure
of colonies and populations (Bourke and Franks, 1995; Crozier and Pamilo,
1996). While incorporating great genetic and ecologic complexity, all these
models were based on the unrealistic assumption that workers can attain their
equilibrium sex ratio without any cost. This assumption is likely to be wrong
in most cases. Adjusting sex allocation requires that workers manipulate the
queen-controlled egg sex ratio. Two mechanisms have been described how they
can do so. First, workers can eliminate male brood and invest the released re-
sources in the production of more females. This mechanism has been found to
be used by workers of the ant Formica exsecta (Sundstro¨m et al., 1996). But
in this species the elimination of males has also been shown result in a loss of
resources, because energy already invested in the individuals killed cannot be
completely recovered (Chapuisat et al., 1997). Additional costs may arise if the
timespan between elimination of males and the end of the reproductive season
is too short for all replacement females to complete development. A second
mechanism allowing workers to adjust sex allocation consists of influencing the
caste determination of female brood. In many species, the quantity and/or
quality of nutrition during development determines whether females become
workers or gynes. Workers can use the mechanism of caste determination for
adjusting sex allocation by manipulating the number of females reared as sex-
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uals. Workers of the ant Leptothorax acervorum have been shown to control
colony sex allocation in this way (Hammond et al., 2002). Sex ratio manipula-
tion via female caste determination is almost certainly associated with costs.
Raising more females as gynes reduces the investment in new workers, thereby
compromising colony growth and productivity.
In this paper we incorporate the costs imposed by the workers’ brood ma-
nipulation in a general model of sex ratio evolution under worker control. In
a first model we assume that cost is identical in all colonies. We show that
sex ratio manipulation is under the influence of two opposing selective forces.
Individual-level selection, mediated by the difference in relatedness to male
and female sexuals, acts in favour of sex ratio biasing. On the other hand,
colony-level selection acts against sex ratio biasing, because the costs of brood
manipulation reduce colony productivity. The resulting equilibrium sex al-
location can fall short of the 3:1 female-bias predicted by Trivers and Hare.
In a second model we explore how variations in cost between colonies influ-
ence colony sex allocation. Variations are expected for example due to spatial
fluctuations in resource availability which influence the cost of replacing elim-
inated male brood. We predict that colonies differing in cost will diverge with
respect to the sex ratios they produce, whereby colonies in which sex ratio
manipulation is less costly will produce dis-proportionally female-biased sex
ratios whereas colonies in which manipulation is more costly will reduce female
bias in sex allocation.
The Model
Our model investigates the evolution of sex allocation among the sexuals pro-
duced by colonies of social Hymenoptera. We consider a large population of
colonies. Each colony is composed of one queen and workers. The queen pro-
duces a primary sex ratio p, defined as the proportion of females among sexual
brood. Workers alter the egg sex ratio, changing the proportion of females by
mi. We assume that workers do so collectively and will not consider variations
in behaviour among workers of a same colony. The sex ratio of sexuals pro-
duced by colony i is therefore given by si = p +mi. As our analysis focuses
on the evolution of worker behaviour, we assume the primary sex ratio p to
be invariable. In numerical calculations, we will fix its value to the queen’s
equilibrium sex ratio p = 0.5. Fixing p to different values below p = 0.75
would not change our results qualitatively.
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Sex ratio manipulation is assumed to entail a cost in terms of colony pro-
ductivity which is reduced by a proportion γ(mi) = mai . Colony productivity
is thus given by Pi = 1− γ(mi). The parameter a determines the form of the
cost function. We assume values of a ≥ 1, corresponding to an increase of
cost with manipulation which is either linear (a = 1) or exponential (a > 1).
In the latter case, greater values of a result in a cost function that increases
more slowly over the range of m considered here (Fig. 2.1). The assumption of
exponential cost can be justified for both mechanisms of brood manipulation.
The manipulation of female cast will cause an exponential cost, because of its
negative impact on worker production. In several species, colony productiv-
ity has been shown to be a saturating function of worker number (e.g. Brian,
1956; Tschinkel, 1993; Sundstro¨m, 1995). In this case, reducing the colony’s
worker force by raising female brood as sexuals decreases productivity at an
accelerating rate. Also the elimination of males as a means of sex ratio adjust-
ment can cause exponential costs. This should be the case, for example, when
morphological differences among males generate variance in how easily males
can be identified as such. Small alterations of sex ratio can then be achieved
by eliminating males whose sex can be easily determined. Accomplishing a
stronger bias in sex allocation, however, will incur much higher costs because
it involves the culling of brood whose sex is more uncertain. This implies an
elevated risk of eliminating females by accident.
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Figure 2.1: Reduction of colony productivity γ as a function of the degree of
sex ratio manipulation m. Cost functions are shown for different values of a.
We assume that the sexuals produced in the population mate randomly
with the mating success of a given sex being proportional to the inverse of the
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population mean investment in that sex (e.g. Crozier and Pamilo, 1996). The
fitness of a member of colony i gained through males (Wm) and females (Wf )
is proportional to the product of colony productivity, the colony’s investment
in a sex, and mating success, Wm = Pi(1−si)/(1−s) and Wf = Pisi/s, where
s = p+m is the mean investment in females in the population.
Based on the above assumptions we can express the fitness of workers in
colony i as the sum of fitness gained through males and females, weighted by
the two sexes’ reproductive values cm and cf ,
Wi = cmWm + cfWf . (2.1)
The evolutionary change in sex ratio manipulation is given by the deriva-
tive of worker fitness (Eq. 2.1) with respect to a random genotype g′ in the
descendant generation (Taylor and Frank, 1996; Frank, 1998)
dWi
dg′i
= cm
dWm
dg′m
+ cf
dWf
dg′f
dWi
dg′i
= cm
∂Wm
∂mi
dmi
dg′m
+ cm
∂Wm
∂m
dm
dg′m
+ cf
∂Wf
∂mi
dmi
dg′f
+ cf
∂Wf
∂m
dm
dg′f
. (2.2)
The terms dmi/dg′m and dmi/dg′f represent the correlations between the
genotypes of males and females produced in nest i and the strategy mi ap-
plied by workers of that nest. The two ratios correspond to worker-offspring
relatedness rm and rf . Similarly, dm/dg′m and dm/dg′f express the correla-
tions of descendant genotypes with the average strategy in the population,
m, corresponding to the relatedness between male and female offspring of the
focal colony and a random member of the population, Rm and Rf . We assume
that the population is very large and random mating occurs. Therefore, Rm
and Rf are equal to zero and terms in Equation 2.2 containing dm/dg′m and
dm/dg′f cancel.
Substituting the expressions for Wm and Wf into Equation 2.2 we obtain
dWi
dg′i
= cmrm
(
− s
′
i
1− s(1− γi)−
1− si
1− s γ
′
i
)
+ cfrf
(
s′i
s
(1− γi)− si
s
γ′i
)
, (2.3)
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where s′ and γ′ denote derivatives of s and γ with respect to mi. Solving
∂Wi/∂g
′
i = 0 at mi = m gives us the equilibrium condition for sex ratio
manipulation
γ′ (cmrm + cfrf ) = s′(1− γ)
(
cfrf
1
s
− cmrm 11− s
)
. (2.4)
Equation 2.4 is arranged so as to emphasise the selective forces acting on
worker sex ratio manipulation. The left-hand side corresponds to the force of
selection acting on the colony-level against manipulation of sex allocation. It
contains the change in colony productivity (γ′) caused by a change in worker
strategy m. The right-hand side assembles the benefit of sex ratio manipula-
tion which is mainly determined by the difference in the workers’ relatedness
to female and male sexuals.
In the case where sex ratio manipulation has no cost (γ(mi) = 0), colony
level selection is null (γ′ = 0). If we solve for the evolutionary stable (ES)
manipulation m∗ while substituting s = p+m, we recover Trivers and Hare’s
prediction for sex allocation under worker control as
m∗ =
cfrf
cfrf + cmrm
− p . (2.5)
In the absence of cost, workers will manipulate sex allocation up to a value of
cfrf/(cfrf + cmrm), i.e. up to a secondary sex ratio of 0.75 in the case of a
colony headed by a single once-mated queen.
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Figure 2.2: ES sex ratio manipulation by workers (m∗) and the resulting colony
sex ratio (s∗) as a function of the cost of manipulation (a). Calculations assume
cfrf = 0.75, cfrf = 0.25, and p = 0.5.
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With costs of manipulation, however, the reduction in colony productivity
selects against sex ratio manipulation and the workers’ optimal sex allocation
departs from the 3:1 ratio predicted by Trivers and Hare. The extent of
deviation depends on the steepness of the cost function γ, i.e. the value of a
(Fig. 2.2). If cost is a linear function of manipulation (a = 1), workers are
not selected to manipulate sex ratio at all and workers rear brood in the sex
ratio produced by queens (s = p, Fig. 2.2). With the cost functions becoming
flatter (increasing values of a), ES manipulation increases and sex allocation
becomes more female-biased. For values of a becoming very large, ES sex
ratio manipulation asymptotically approaches m = 0.25, corresponding to the
Trivers and Hare prediction of a 3:1 sex ratio (s = 0.75).
So far we have assumed that the cost of sex ratio manipulation is equal in
all colonies of a population. However, the cost of eliminating brood or influ-
encing female cast might depend on environmental factors, such as resource
availability or micro-climate. Spatial variations in these factors are therefore
expected to lead to variations in cost of sex ratio manipulation. Extending
Equation 2.1, we now introduce such variations in our model. We analyse the
simplest case possible, consisting of two classes of colonies that differ in the
form of the cost function γ, i.e. in the value of parameter a. Colonies of the
two classes occur with constant frequencies q1 and q2 = 1 − q1. We assume
that class membership is determined by the environment and independent of
genotype. Workers can detect which class their colony belongs to and in re-
sponse apply one of two sex ratio manipulation strategies. The two strategies
evolve as independent characters, but sex allocation in the two classes is linked
because sexuals from both classes compete with each other for matings.
We denote class with subscript j. Workers in colony i of class j manipulate
sex ratio by mji resulting in a secondary sex ratio sji = p +mji, where p is
again assumed to be constant over colonies and classes. Manipulation reduces
colony productivity by γ(mji) = γji = m
aj
ji . Class means of manipulation,
secondary sex ratio, and cost are denoted by mj , sj , and γj , respectively.
As before, the evolutionary change of sex ratio manipulation is given by the
derivative of fitness with respect to offspring genotype
dWji
dg′
= cmrm
(
− s
′
ji
1− s(1− γji)−
1− sji
1− s γ
′
ji
)
+ cfrf
(
s′ji
s
(1− γji)− sji
s
γ′ji
)
. (2.6)
14 Chapter 2. Levels of selection and sex ratio conflict
2 4 6 10 20
Cost parameter a in class-1 colonies
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
se
x 
ra
tio
 s
 (
  )
Se
x 
ra
tio
 m
an
ip
ul
at
io
n 
m
 (
 , 
 )
Figure 2.3: ES sex ratio manipulation by workers in the two colony classes
(m) and population sex ratio (s) as a function of cost of manipulation (a) in
class 1.Values of m for class 1 are given as black squares, those for class 2 as
black circles. Population sex ratio is given as grey diamonds. Cost in class
2 is constant (a = 2) and calculations assume q1 = q2 = 0.5, cfrf = 0.75,
cfrf = 0.25, and p = 0.5 for both classes.
where
s =
∑
qj
1− γj
1−∑ γj sj (2.7)
is the population sex ratio with class sex ratios being weighted by class fre-
quencies and relative productivities.
The equilibrium level of sex ratio manipulation has to be calculated for the
two classes separately by setting ∂Wji/∂g′ji = 0 and solving at sji = sj = s∗j .
Sex ratio manipulation in class j is at equilibrium when
γ′j
(
cmrm
1− s∗j
1− s + cfrf
s∗j
s
)
= s′j(1− γj)
(
cfrf
1
s
− cmrm 11− s
)
(2.8)
Figure 2.3 shows ES levels of sex ratio manipulation in two equifrequent
classes (q1 = q2 = 0.5). As expected, equal cost in both classes (a1 = a2 = 2)
leads to a unique ES strategy and workers in all colonies manipulate sex ratio
to the same degree. However, if cost varies between colony classes, equilibrium
strategies diverge. Colonies in the class with cheaper manipulation (low-cost
colonies) will bias sex ratio to a greater degree than colonies in which ma-
nipulation is more costly (high-cost colonies). The divergence between the
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Figure 2.4: ES manipulation by workers in the two colony classes (m) and
population sex ratio (s) as a function of the frequency of class 1 (q1). ES ma-
nipulation in classes 1 and 2 are given as black squares and circles, respectively,
population sex ratio as grey diamonds. Calculations assume q1 = q2 = 0.5,
cfrf = 0.75, cfrf = 0.25, and p = 0.5 for both classes. a) a1 = 4, a2 = 2. b)
a1 = 10, a2 = 2
two ES strategies exceeds that expected based on the difference in cost alone
(cf. Fig. 2.2). The reason is that competition in the mating population drives
investment strategies of the two classes apart. The female bias in the sexuals
produced by low-cost colonies decreases female mating success, which in turn
selects workers in high-cost colonies to reduce sex ratio manipulation. How
much sex ratio manipulation diverges between the two classes depends on how
different their cost functions are. As shown in Figure 2.3, decreasing cost in
one class (i.e. increasing a) while leaving it constant in the other class results
in stronger sex ratio specialisation in both classes. Along with this goes an
increase in overall population sex ratio, caused by the reduction in mean cost
in the population (Fig. 2.3, diamonds).
The ES levels of sex ratio manipulation also depend on the frequencies of
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the two colony classes in the population. As illustrated in Figure 2.4, the
strategy of workers in a given class becomes extremer as that class gets rarer.
This can lead to no manipulation (m = 0 or complete manipulation (m = 0.5)
with low frequencies of high- and low-cost colonies, respectively (Fig. 2.4b).
Class frequencies also have an influence on population sex ratio, which becomes
more female biased as the frequency of low-cost colonies increases (Fig. 2.4,
diamonds). However, workers in low-cost colonies will prevent an increase
of the population female bias beyond the worker optimum of s = 0.75 by
adapting their level of sex ratio manipulation (Fig. 2.4b).
Discussion
The models presented in this article demonstrate the importance of proximate
mechanisms for the evolution of optimal sex allocation under worker control.
Because workers have to manipulate the brood sex ratio in order to adjust sex
allocation, the negative effects of this manipulation on colony productivity will
select against sex ratio biasing by workers. The impact of costs of sex ratio
manipulation on the evolution of sex allocation is therefore opposed to that
of relatedness asymmetry (RA), which selects workers for biasing colony sex
allocation towards more closely related females. Under the influence of these
two opposing forces, sex allocation will evolve towards an equilibrium at which
the fitness gain of biasing sex ratio towards females is equal to the fitness loss
due to the reduction in overall production of sexuals.
By selecting against sex ratio biasing, costs of brood manipulation can
significantly decrease female-bias in the workers’ optimal sex allocation. For
example, a cost that would reduce colony productivity by less than 5% in or-
der to attain the Trivers and Hare sex ratio of 3:1 (cost parameter a = 2.2)
shifts the worker optimum from 3:1 to 2.2:1. The strong effect of costs on the
workers’s sex ratio optimum might partly account for the global deviation of
sex ratios produced by monogynous ant species from the 3:1 ratio predicted
by Trivers and Hare (Pamilo, 1990; Boomsma, 1989). So far, two explanations
had been invoked in order to explain this discrepancy. First, social structure
in the species classified as monogynous might deviate in some way from the as-
sumptions of the Trivers and Hare model (Bourke and Franks, 1995; Boomsma,
1989; Nonacs, 1986). For example, polygyny (multiple queen colonies) with
related queens, multiple mating by queens or worker reproduction might occur
at low frequencies. All of these lower RA and therefore decrease female bias
Discussion 17
in the workers’ equilibrium sex ratio. Alternatively, workers and queens might
share control in some of the species. Colony sex allocation is then expected
to be intermediate between the workers’ 3:1 and the queen’s 1:1 optima (e.g.
Matessi and Eshel, 1992, Chapter 3). However, costs of sex ratio manipula-
tion perhaps provide a more general explanation for why sex allocation falls
short of the 3:1 prediction. The egg sex ratio being naturally controlled by
the queen, worker control of sex allocation requires the manipulation of brood.
Whenever this manipulation is associated with costs (which is probably true
in most cases) we expect sex allocation to be less female-biased than 3:1.
The extent to which optimal sex allocation deviates from the value pre-
dicted by RA depends on the magnitude of costs: the more costly sex ratio
manipulation, the greater the deviation. Variations in cost between species,
between populations, or between colonies might therefore account for the vari-
ations in sex allocation that have been observed at these different scales (e.g.
Pamilo, 1990; Brian, 1979; Brown and Keller, 2000). The exact causes for
the variations in cost may differ between the levels of organisation. Between
species, differences in cost are most likely due to the exact mechanisms used
by workers to manipulate sex ratio. Species with more costly mechanisms
of sex ratio biasing are expected to have a less female-biased sex allocation
than species in which sex ratio manipulation is more efficient. Adjusting the
brood sex ratio by eliminating male brood, for example, might affect colony
productivity differently than adjusting brood sex ratio by biasing female caste
determination. Morphological differences between taxa might also influence
the cost of sex ratio biasing. If workers use the size of larvae and pupae as a
cue to determine the sex of the brood, they are expected have more difficulties
in discriminating between males and females in species where both sexes are
of similar size. This, in turn, should increase the cost of sex ratio manipu-
lation due to the risk of accidentally manipulating brood of the wrong sex.
Consequently, we predict a global correlation between sexual dimorphism and
female bias (Chapter 3). This trend has indeed been described, albeit with a
different interpretation (Boomsma, 1989).
At the level of populations or colonies, variations in cost are more likely
to result from environmental factors. For example, climatic conditions may
influence whether females raised in replacement of eliminated males are able
to complete development before the end of the reproductive season. Similarly,
food availability might determine to what extent the loss of resources due to
the elimination of males affects colony productivity. An association between
resource availability and population sex ratio has indeed been reported from
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the ant species Tetramorium caespitum (Brian, 1979), Lasius niger (Boomsma
et al., 1982), Myrmica sulcinodis (Elmes, 1987), and Leptothorax longispinosus
(Herbers, 1990). However, in L. niger and L. longispinosus the variations in
sex allocation could be shown to be independent of habitat quality (van der
Have et al., 1988; Backus and Herbers, 1992). It is therefore not clear whether
resource availability generally affects costs of brood manipulation and sex allo-
cation and whether the effects of resources on sex allocation can be overridden
by other factors.
Our models have shown that variations in cost of sex ratio manipulation
between colonies are amplified by competition in the mating population and
result in even stronger variations in sex allocation. Colonies in which costs are
high will produce relatively less females than expected on the basis of costs
alone, while colonies where costs are low produce relatively more females.
Sex ratio specialisation (or split sex ratios) have been predicted to arise in two
other situations. Grafen (1986) argued that sex ratio specialisation is expected
to occur whenever the relative cost of producing males and females differs
between colonies. Colonies will then invest more in the sex which, relative
to the population mean, is cheaper for them to produce. Alternatively, split
sex ratios have been predicted to arise from variations in RA between colonies
which create differences in the relative benefit of producing males and females
(Boomsma and Grafen, 1990, 1991). If colonies vary in their social structure,
then workers in colonies in which RA is above the population average will
favour a higher investment in females. Workers in colonies with below-average
RA will favour to produce more males. The association of RA with sex ratio
specialisation has been investigated empirically in many species exhibiting
split sex ratios. While in some cases the observed variation in colony sex
allocation could effectively be attributed to variations in RA, in many other
species it could not (e.g. Helms, 1999; Brown and Keller, 2000; Fjerdingstad
et al., 2002). In these cases, the consideration of proximate factors such as
costs of sex ratio manipulation or male and female production might explain
some of the observed variance in sex allocation.
In conclusion, this work demonstrates that proximate mechanisms can ac-
count for some of the deviations of empirical sex ratio data from predictions
based on ultimate arguments alone. Presently, it is impossible to test our
model because we lack information on costs of sex ratio manipulation in nat-
ural colonies of social insects. Obtaining these data is difficult because the
level of sex ratio biasing has to be manipulated indirectly. This could be done
by artificially changing the primary sex ratio. Increasing the proportion of fe-
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males among sexual brood approaches the sex ratio to the workers’ optimum
and should reduce the level of manipulation, while increasing the proportion
of males should have the opposite effect. Measuring productivity in colonies
with manipulated brood sex ratio should allow to assess the costs of sex ratio
manipulation. Such data, although difficult to obtain, would finally allow us
to complete the circle from ultimate causes of queen-worker conflict to the
proximate mechanisms of worker sex ratio manipulation and back to their
ultimate impact on the worker sex ratio optimum.
Summary
In eusocial Hymenoptera, queens and workers are in conflict over optimal
sex allocation. Sex ratio theory, while providing us with predictions on the
extent of conflict under a wide range of conditions, has neglected the fact that
worker control of investment requires the manipulation of brood sex ratio.
This manipulation is likely to incur costs, for example if workers eliminate
male eggs to bias sex allocation towards more females. In this paper, we
present a model of sex ratio evolution under worker control that incorporate
costs of brood manipulation. We assume costs to be a continuous, increasing
function of the magnitude of sex ratio manipulation. We demonstrate that
costs exert a selective force at the colony level that counter-acts individual
selection in favour of sex ratio biasing. Thus, costs of sex ratio manipulation
can account for part of the discrepancies between theoretical and observed
values of sex allocation. Further, we show that variations in costs of sex
ratio manipulation between colonies can lead to split sex ratios. This suggests
that costs of manipulation might be a factor that, in addition to variation in
relatedness asymmetry and heterogeneity in resource availability, induces sex
ratio specialisation.
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Introduction
One of the major trade-offs in an organism’s life-history is that between invest-
ment in reproduction versus body growth (Stearns, 1992). Spending resources
on immediate reproduction provides direct fitness gain but decreases somatic
growth and expected future reproduction. The evolutionary optimal strategy
is continued growth until the fitness gain due to increased size is exactly coun-
terbalanced by the fitness obtained by immediate reproduction. This principle
can be applied to predict investment in colony growth in social insects with
morphological castes, whereby workers are the equivalent of somatic tissue and
new queens (gynes) and males constitute the reproductive investment. How-
ever, in contrast to unitary organisms which consist of clonal cells (r = 1),
colonies of social insects contain individuals whose relatedness is lower than
one (r < 1). This genetic heterogeneity results in potential genetic conflicts
over resource allocation and reproductive decisions (Hamilton, 1964; Pamilo,
1991; Ratnieks and Reeve, 1992; Keller and Chapuisat, 1999; Keller and Reeve,
1999). Genetic conflicts are of particular importance in eusocial Hymenoptera
(ants, bees and wasps), whereby the haplodiploid sex-determination system
creates relatedness asymmetries among family members. Because workers are
more closely related to their sisters than to their brothers they should favor a
female-biased sex allocation (here defined as the relative investment in gynes
and males). In contrast, queens are equally related to their sons and daughters
and favor an even resource investment into both sexes. Thus, queen-worker
conflict over sex-allocation arises.
Sex ratio conflict has been extensively investigated both theoretically and
empirically (e.g. Trivers and Hare, 1976; Charnov, 1978; Nonacs, 1986; Boomsma
and Grafen, 1990; Boomsma et al., 1999; Pamilo, 1991; Sundstro¨m, 1994;
Bourke and Franks, 1995; Crozier and Pamilo, 1996; Chapuisat and Keller,
1999). In contrast, little attention has been paid to the question of how conflict
among colony members extends to resource allocation to colony growth and
maintenance (worker production) versus reproduction (production of males
and gynes), and contradictory conclusions have been reached by different au-
thors. Pamilo (1991) suggested that conflict over colony growth arises between
queens and workers, with workers preferring a greater investment in gynes as
opposed to workers than the queen. However, Bourke and Chan (1999) sug-
gested that conflict between queens and workers should be absent if the relative
investment in worker and sexual production does not affect a colony’s sex al-
location (the proportional investment in gynes versus males). That is, both
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queens and workers should favor the investment in workers that ultimately
maximises the lifetime colony production of reproductive individuals. Finally,
yet another conclusion was reached by Bourke and Ratnieks (1999) while in-
vestigating conflict over caste determination, the irreversible process during
which a female larva morphologically and physiologically specialises to become
either a worker or a new queen. The authors found conflict between queens
and workers to arise over the developmental pathway of individual female lar-
vae, with workers preferring a higher proportion of females larvae to develop
into gynes than the queen. The analysis of Bourke and Ratnieks (1999) also
included the interests of the female brood itself and they found that female
larvae are in conflict with queens and workers under a wide range of condi-
tions. Because female larvae are more closely related to themselves than to the
sexuals they would raise as workers they frequently benefit to become sexuals
under conditions where queens and workers would benefit from increasing the
size of the colony’s workerforce.
In this paper we reconsider the problem of potential conflict over resource
allocation in the production of workers, males, and gynes. We construct a
simple and general kin-selection model which allows to investigate the simul-
taneous evolution of investment in workers and sex allocation. This is a signif-
icant step towards a better understanding of optimal reproductive allocation
and sex ratio conflict because previous models dealt either with sex alloca-
tion, neglecting investment in colony growth, or with optimal investment in
colony growth in the situation where sex allocation is fixed. Moreover, in our
analyses, we explicitly consider the power that queens and workers have to
manipulate resource allocation and the selection pressures acting on queens,
workers and larvae to do so.
Our model shows that queen-worker conflict occurs over sex allocation but
not colony growth. The evolutionary stable investment in workers is the same
for both parties when one of them has complete control over resource allo-
cation, i.e., the relative investment in workers, gynes, and males. Complete
control by one party is, however, evolutionary unstable because it strongly se-
lects the other party to manipulate sex allocation in its favor. When no party
can monopolise control over resource allocation, the investment in worker pro-
duction is predicted to be lower than the two parties’ optimum. This is because
the queen’s and workers’ attempts to bias sex allocation in their favor are at
the detriment of worker production. Our model also confirms the occurrence
of conflict between adult colony members and female larvae over their de-
velopmental fate. Under most conditions individual female larvae benefit to
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escape adult control of caste determination and develop into gynes. Finally,
our model sheds light on the reasons for which previous authors had reached
different conclusions about whether or not queens and workers are in con-
flict over the relative amount of resources that should be allocated to worker
production.
The Model
In our model, we consider a colony with one or several queens (mated with a
variable number of males) and sterile workers. Males and gynes are assumed
to disperse so that neither inbreeding, nor local mate competition (Hamilton,
1967), nor local resource competition (Clark, 1978) occur. Workers, gynes
and males are assumed to be equally costly to produce. Therefore, the pro-
portional investment into one class of individuals corresponds to the number
of individuals of this class relative to the total number of individuals produced.
We will thus indiscriminately use sex ratio and sex allocation throughout the
manuscript. In the colony, investment in workers, gynes, and males is de-
termined by two parameters. The first one, f , describes the proportion of
resources that are allocated to the production of female, i.e., workers and
gynes (hereafter referred to as proportional investment in females). Corre-
spondingly, the quantity (1− f) is the proportion of resources invested in the
production of males. The second parameter determining resource allocation
is w, the proportion of the allocation to females that is devoted to the pro-
duction of workers. The remainder (1− w) goes into the production of gynes.
Because of the equal cost of gynes and workers, the parameter w therefore de-
scribes the proportion of females that will develop into workers. In sum, the
colony invests a proportion fw of resources in workers, a proportion f(1−w)
in gynes, and (1 − f) in males. The population means of the proportional
investments are given by capital letters, i.e., FW into workers, F (1−W ) into
gynes, and (1− F ) into males. For the sake of simplicity, our model does not
consider any temporal variation of investment that might occur in the course
of colony ontogeny. It predicts the overall investment in workers, gynes, and
males over the whole colony life.
Because per worker productivity declines with the number of workers per
colony in eusocial Hymenoptera (Brian, 1956; Tschinkel, 1993; Sundstro¨m,
1995), overall colony productivity (biomass of workers, gynes, and males pro-
duced) is assumed to increase with colony size according to the following di-
The Model 25
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
R
el
at
iv
e 
pr
o
du
ct
iv
ity
0
1
Proportional investment in workers
Total biomass
Sexual biomass
Figure 3.1: Relative productivity of a colony as a function of proportional
investment in workers. The solid line shows the total productivity (workers
and sexuals), the dotted line the productivity of sexuals only.
minishing return function b(f, w) = 1 − (1 − fw)2. Under this function, pro-
ductivity varies between zero when the relative investment in workers is zero
and 1 (maximum productivity), when all resources are allocated to worker pro-
duction (Figure 3.1, solid line). The productivity in terms of sexual biomass
(gynes and males) is given by b(f, w)(1− fw) (Figure 3.1, dotted line). (Note
that choosing another functions with diminishing returns does not affect the
qualitative results of our model.)
The inclusive fitness VX of a colony member X depends on the biomass of
males and gynes produced, the regression relatedness of females (gfX), and
males (gmX) to X, the reproductive values of females (νf = 1) and males
(νm = 0.5), and the mating success of female reproductives (1/[F (1 −W )])
and males (1/[1− F ]) (Crozier and Pamilo, 1996). Taking into account these
variables, the fitness of individual X is given as
VX = b(f, w)
(
f(1− w)gfXνf
F (1−W ) +
(1− f)gmXνm
(1− F )
)
(3.1)
The fitness function (Eq. 3.1) allows us to calculate the evolutionary stable
(ES) values for the proportional investment in females f and the proportion
of females developing into workers w in function of (i) who in the colony has
control of these two variables, and (ii) the kin structure of the colony.
The question of who controls the two parameters (f and w) that determine
resource allocation is important because queens and workers might differ in
their optimal values. The queen can produce males by laying unfertilised
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haploid eggs and females by producing fertilised diploid eggs. She is therefore
a priori in control of proportional investment in females. However, workers
may alter the sex allocation by selectively eliminating brood of one sex [most
likely males, as has been demonstrated in the ant Formica exsecta (Sundstro¨m
et al., 1996; Chapuisat et al., 1997)] to raise more individuals of the other sex.
In this way workers can gain control over proportional investment in females.
There has been considerable discussion about who (the queen, the work-
ers or the female larvae) is in control of caste determination, and therefore
able to regulate the proportion of females that develop into workers versus
gynes. Female development had long been assumed manipulated by queen
produced pheromones (Brian, 1980; Fletcher and Ross, 1985; Ho¨lldobler and
Bartz, 1985). However, this view has been challenged because there is no
empirical data in favor of pheromonal control, whereby queens are able to
chemically force female larvae to develop into workers rather than queens
(Keller and Nonacs, 1993). In fact, there is increasing evidence that queen
pheromones act as honest signals of queen fecundity to which other colony
members respond by altering reproductive decisions (e.g. Pettis et al., 1997;
Ortius and Heinze, 1999). An alternative way for queens to influence caste
determination is by producing different types of eggs, which has been docu-
mented in two species of ants. In Pheidole pallidula queens produce diploid
eggs that vary in their content of juvenile hormone and develop either into
workers or gynes (Passera, 1980; Wheeler, 1986). Similarly, Formica polyctena
queens can apparently bias caste determination by varying eggs size and the
amount of RNA and other biochemical substances in the eggs (Wheeler, 1986,
and references therein). Since it is yet unclear who is controlling caste deter-
mination and because there might be interspecific variation, we will consider
the three possible scenarios of caste determination, with the developmental
fate of larvae being either under the control of the queen, the workers or the
larva itself.
In our model we will first consider the case where either the queens or
workers have complete control over f and w, i.e., the proportional investment
in females and the proportion of females raised as workers. Complete queen
control may occur when (i) queens limit the number of eggs produced thus
making eggs a limiting resources which forces workers to raise all the brood
present in the colony (Rosenheim et al., 1996), and (ii) queens control caste
determination, which may be the case in species with blastogenic caste de-
termination (i.e., when maternal effects determine the developmental fate of
female brood; Passera, 1980; Wheeler, 1986). Alternatively, complete worker
The Model 27
control may occur when i) the number of female eggs is not limited, ii) workers
are able to assess the sex of eggs or young larvae and eliminate males with-
out any cost and thereby alter the queen-produced primary sex ratio, and iii)
workers control caste determination, for example through differential feeding
of the larvae.
Next we will consider the case of mixed queen and worker control over
resource allocation. Although single-party control is possible under a restricted
set of conditions (see above) queens and workers most likely share control over
investment in the majority of species (Trivers and Hare, 1976; Bourke and
Franks, 1995). This is because when sex allocation is at one party’s optimum,
the other party is under strong selection to manipulate sex allocation to its
own advantage. We will consider the most likely situation of mixed control,
that is queens control proportional investment into females (workers + gynes)
by limiting the number of eggs, whereas workers control caste determination,
that is the proportion of females developing into workers versus gynes. Note
that in this case worker fitness will be principally limited by the number of
female eggs available and not so much the overall number of eggs. Active
egg limitation by the queen is therefore equivalent to a limitation of female
eggs only, in which case workers raise all female eggs and invest the remaining
resources in the rearing of as many male eggs as possible.
Single-party control
The ES investment pattern when a single party is in control of resource al-
location (f and w) can be found by substituting the corresponding values of
relatedness for that party in Eq. 3.1 and maximizing the function simulta-
neously for f and w at w = W = w∗ and f = F = f∗. For queen control
under monogyny (single-queen colonies) and monandry (single queen mating)
we substitute the relatedness values gf = 0.5 and gm = 1. The ES solution
is (fQ∗ = 0.71, wQ∗ = 0.59), meaning that 71% of the resources are invested
in females of which 59% go into workers. The resulting allocation pattern is
42% of the resources invested in workers, 29% in gynes, and 29% in males.
The investment in males and gynes is even, as predicted from sex ratio theory
when queens control colony sex allocation (Trivers and Hare 1976), and the al-
location to workers is the one that maximises sexual production (cf. Fig. 3.1).
The numerical value of the relative investment in workers has of course no
biological meaning as it critically depends on the function b(f, w) that was
chosen. A different ES investment in workers would be found if one would use
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a different function, but the important point is that it would always be the
one that maximises the overall productivity of males and gynes.
The ES values of f and w under complete worker control of resource al-
location can be obtained in the same manner by substituting gf = 0.75 and
gm = 0.5 in Equation 1 and maximizing for f and w. The values obtained
are (fW ∗ = 0.86, wW ∗ = 0.49), which corresponds to an investment of 42% in
workers, 44% in gynes, and 14% in males. The optimal investment in workers
is the same as for queens and it is the value which maximises the colony’s
overall production of gynes and males. However, contrary to queens, workers
favour a three times higher investment in gynes than males, as predicted by
sex ratio theory (Trivers and Hare, 1976). [Note that the small deviation of the
predicted sex investment ratio (44% gynes : 14% males) from the theoretical
prediction of 3:1 is due to rounding].
More complex kin structures that result from polyandry (multiple mat-
ing by queens) or polygyny (multiple reproductive queens per colony) affect
relatedness asymmetries between colony members and thus the workers’ op-
timal sex allocation. However, both, under complete queen and complete
worker control, the ES investment in workers is not influenced by the level of
polyandry or polygyny, because both parties benefit from maximizing overall
colony productivity of sexuals.
In summary, complete control of resource allocation by either queens or
workers leads to each party favouring the relative investment in worker pro-
duction that maximises overall productivity of sexuals, and this is true what-
ever the kin structure of the colony. In contrast, queens and workers diverge in
the optimal investment in males and gynes, as expected from sex ratio theory.
Consequently, queen-worker conflict arises over the allocation of resources to
male and female reproductives not but not over worker production.
Mixed control
When colony and population sex allocation are at one party’s optimum, this
exerts a selective pressure on the other party to bias sex allocation to its own
advantage. Our model allows to determine the strength and direction of this
selective pressure by calculating the selection gradient, which is the coefficient
of a regression of fitness on phenotype (Lande and Arnold, 1983). The selection
gradient is equivalent to the derivative of the fitness function with respect to
phenotype. We can thus quantify the selection acting on queens and workers
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by calculating the partial derivatives of their inclusive fitnesses with respect
to f and w.
Consider first the case of complete worker control under monogyny and
monandry. The predicted investment in workers is 42% and the sex allocation
3:1 female biased. The gradient of selection on queens to alter the proportional
investment in females is given by the partial derivative of Equation 3.1 with
respect to f . Substituting the values gf = 0.5, gm = 1, F = 0.86, and
w = W = 0.49 gives a partial derivative of βf = ∂VQ/∂f = −1.35. This
negative value indicates that complete worker control of resource allocation
selects queens to decrease the colony’s proportional investment in females,
which can be achieved by producing a more male biased primary sex ratio and
limiting the number of eggs laid.
Alternatively, in the case of complete queen control of caste allocation,
the investment in workers still is 42%, but the sex allocation is now even.
The gradient of selection acting on workers can be obtained by the partial
derivative of worker fitness with respect to w at f = F = 0.71, W = 0.59,
and substituting the workers’ relatedness to males and gynes (gf = 0.75, gm =
0.5), which gives βw = ∂VW /∂w = −0.41. This negative value indicates that
workers benefit from directing a greater proportion of the female brood towards
gyne development even though this decreases overall colony productivity.
In summary, neither complete queen control nor complete worker control of
resource allocation are stable evolutionary equilibria. Both situations lead to
strong selection on the party not in control of resource allocation to manipulate
investment to its own favour. If manipulation is possible, mixed control of
caste allocation will arise and queen and worker strategies of manipulation
and counter-manipulation will evolve in response to each other. A stable
equilibrium will be reached when (i) the queen cannot increase her inclusive
fitness by altering the proportional investment in females via the primary
sex ratio produced, and (ii) workers cannot increase their inclusive fitness by
changing the proportion of female larvae raised as workers versus gynes. We
can find the ES equilibrium for f and w by solving the equation system
∂VQ
∂f
∣∣∣∣
f=F=f∗
= 0
∂VW
∂w
∣∣∣∣
w=W=w∗
= 0 (3.2)
while substituting the corresponding relatedness values. Under monandry and
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monogyny the equilibrium values are f∗ = 0.72 and w∗ = 0.51, corresponding
to an investment of 36% in workers, 35% in gynes, and 29% in males. This
indicates that colony productivity is suboptimal, because the investment in
workers is smaller than 42%. Sex allocation is intermediate between the queen
and worker optima, the female-to-male investment ratio being at 1.2 : 1. (Note
again that the numerical values should only be considered as indicative of the
qualitative, but not quantitative change in caste allocation.)
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Figure 3.2: Evolutionary equilibria of proportional investment in females (f),
and proportion of workers among females (w), as a function of a) queen mating
frequency (k) (assuming monogyny and equal paternity among males), and b)
the number of nestmate queens (n) [assuming full sister queens (gQQ = 0.75),
single mating, and equal contribution of queens to the production of workers,
males, and gynes]. f is assumed to be under queen control whereas w is
controlled by the workers.
The ES values of f and w under polyandry or polygyny can be calculated by
substituting the corresponding relatedness values in Equation 3.2. Polyandry
reduces the relatedness among female offspring of the queen (workers and gy-
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nes) whereas worker-male relatedness remains constant. Hence, relatedness
asymmetry decreases as queen mating frequency increases and workers benefit
less from biasing sex allocation toward females. Therefore, multiple mating
reduces conflict between queens and workers over sex allocation and ES re-
source allocation tends towards the values obtained under complete queen
control of resource allocation (Fig. 3.2a, calculations assume even paternity
of the queen’s mates). Concurrently with this tendency, higher queen mat-
ing frequency results in an increase in the proportional investment in workers
which asymptotically approaches the optimal value of 42% (Fig. 3.3a).
Increased levels of polygyny also tend to lead to a less females-biased sex
allocation and to an increase in the relative investment in workers (Figs. 3.2b
and 3.3b, calculations assume equal contribution of queens to the production
of workers, gynes, and males). The effect of increased queen number is the
stronger the more closely queens are related. If queens are unrelated, the
ES sex allocation and the relative investment into workers are not affected
by changes in queen number and remain the same as under monandry and
monogyny. This is because relatedness asymmetry is unaffected by variation
in queen number when queens are unrelated (Frank, 1987).
Larval control of caste determination
So far we have only considered the workers’ and queens’ interests. We will now
investigate whether the interests of the developing larvae diverge from those of
workers and queens. Diverging interests of female larvae would be indicated
by selection favoured larvae escaping adult control of caste determination.
Whether this is the case can be investigated with our model. Consider a
mutant larva that controls its own caste determination and develops with
probability ω into a worker and (1−ω) into a gyne. Other larvae in the colony
in which the mutant occurred become workers and gynes with probabilities
w and (1 − w), respectively, whereby w is determined by either the queen or
workers. Assume also, for simplicity, that the population investment patterns
are the same as in this colony, i.e. W = w and F = f .
The inclusive fitness of the mutant larvae VM is equal to the sum of its
inclusive fitness if developing into a worker (∆VW ) and the inclusive fitness
if developing into a gyne (∆VG), weighted by the respective probabilities,
VM = ω(∆VW ) + (1− ω)(∆VG). The inclusive fitness gained by worker devel-
opment ∆VW is equal to the number of additional males and gynes a colony
would produce with the help of one additional worker multiplied by the larva’s
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Figure 3.3: Evolutionary equilibrium of proportional investment in workers
(fw) in the case where queens control the proportional investment in females
(f) and workers control the proportion of workers among females (w), as a
function of a) queen mating frequency (k) (assuming single-queen colonies and
equal paternity among males), and b) the number of nestmate queens (n) [as-
suming full sister queens (gQQ = 0.75), single mating, and equal contribution
of queens to the production of workers, males, and gynes].
relatedness to these sexuals and their mating success. The increase in colony
productivity can be calculated as follows. If s(f, w) = b(f, w)(1 − fw) de-
scribes the relative production of sexuals in the focal colony, the number of
extra sexuals produced due to one additional worker is given by ∂s/f∂w. This
expression is the slope of sexual production on investment in workers (fw).
The division by f is necessary because overall colony productivity varies be-
tween zero and one, whereas the investment in workers (fw) varies between
zero (for w = 0) and f (for w = 1). Dividing by f corrects for this difference in
scale and one obtains the number of sexuals produced per worker. The direct
fitness obtained by a larva developing into a gyne (∆VG) is simply equal to
her expected mating success [1/F (1−W )], its relatedness to itself being one.
The overall mutant inclusive fitness can thus be written as
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Figure 3.4: Selection differential (β) on a mutant female larva’s probability to
develop into a worker (ω) as a function of egg sex ratio (f) and proportion of
female larvae raised as workers (w).
VM = ω
∂s
∂w
1
f
[
f(1− w)
(1− fw)
gfMνf
F (1−W ) +
(1− f)
(1− fw
gmMνm
(1− F )
]
+ (1− ω) 1
F (1−W ) (3.3)
The gradient of selection acting on ω, the larva’s probability of developing
into a worker, is the partial derivative of VM with respect to ω. This value de-
pends on the colony and population investment pattern (f , w). The selection
pressure on ω for all f and w values in the range between the two extremes
of complete worker and complete queen control is given in Figure 3.4. The
selection gradient is always strongly negative, indicating that a single mutant
larva always benefits to develop into a gyne, and this for all possible values of
f and w.
The question arises as to what will be the equilibrium resource allocation
in the colony when all larvae are in control of their developmental fate. To
investigate this, we need to determine the evolutionary stable proportion of
larvae (w) developing into workers and the adaptive response of colony mem-
bers (workers and queens) in terms of the proportion of females f they would
produce. To find the equilibrium, we have to simultaneously maximise the in-
clusive fitness of the larvae and the party controlling f . For larvae, we replace
ω in Equation 3.3 by w (because at equilibrium all larvae adopt the same
optimal strategy) and substitute the corresponding relatedness values. The
resulting equation is derived with respect to w. For the party controlling f
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we substitute the corresponding relatedness values in Equation 3.1 and derive
with respect to f . The two derivatives are then set equal to zero and solved
for f and w at f = F = f∗ and w =W = w∗.
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Figure 3.5: Evolutionary equilibria of the proportion of female larvae develop-
ing into workers (w) and proportional investment in females (f) a) in function
of queen mating frequency (k) with queen control of proportional investment
in females (f), b) in function of the number of nestmate queens (n) with queen
control of proportional investment in females (f), c) in function of queen mat-
ing frequency (k) with worker control of proportional investment in females
(f), and d) in function of the number of nestmate queens (n) with worker
control of proportional investment in females (f). Graphs a) and c) assume
monogyny and equal paternity among males, graphs b) and d) assume that
queens are full sisters (gQQ = 0.75, squares) or half-sisters (gQQ = 0.5, dia-
monds), single mating, and equal contribution of queens to the production of
workers, males, and gynes.
At equilibrium, the investment in workers is very low and the sex alloca-
tion strongly female biased. Under monandry, monogyny, and queen control
of proportional investment in females the equilibrium is at f∗ = 0.74 and
w∗ = 0.07, corresponding to an overall investment of 5% in workers, 69% in
gynes, and 26% in males. If proportional investment in females is controlled
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by workers, the equilibrium is at f∗ = 0.87 and w∗ = 0.09, that is 8% of the
resources invested in workers, 80% in gynes, and 12% in males. The invest-
ment in workers will be even lower when queens are mated to several males
(Figs. 3.5a and 3.5c) or if colonies contain several queens (Figs. 3.5b and 3.5d).
The decrease associated with the higher levels of polygyny is more pronounced
the less queens are related to each other.
Note that, as in previous analyses, the numerical values given here have no
significance per se because they directly depend on the function b(f, w) that
was chosen. However, the qualitative results of the analyses are not affected by
the particular function, as long as it is one with diminishing returns, and the
important point is that larvae will always be in strong conflict with queens and
workers over their developmental fate. Moreover, this conflict will be stronger
and the proportion of larvae developing into workers lower, the higher the
levels of polyandry and polygyny.
Discussion
Our model shows that potential conflict over investment in workers can arise
in colonies of eusocial Hymenoptera. Although queens’ and workers’ inclusive
fitness are maximal when the investment in workers is at the value that max-
imises colony productivity of sexuals (Bourke and Chan, 1999, this study),
this optimum will be reached only when a single party controls all decisions
about resource allocation. However, our model shows that single-party con-
trol of resource allocation is not evolutionary stable because sex ratio conflict
results in strong selection on the other party manipulate investment. Hence,
the queen will benefit from forcing workers to produce a less female-biased sex
allocation by altering the primary sex ratio and limiting the number of eggs
laid. Limitation of diploid eggs will, in turn, induce workers to direct a higher
proportion of the female larvae into the gyne developmental pathway so as to
achieve a more female-biased sex allocation. This tug-of-war between queens
and workers results in an allocation of resources to workers that is lower than
the optimal value for queens and workers, and a sex allocation intermediate
between the queen and worker optima.
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Resolving controversies among earlier work
Our findings shed light on the causes of discrepancies between earlier theo-
retical studies on the existence of potential queen-worker conflict over colony
growth. Two of these studies concluded that a conflict occurs (Pamilo, 1991;
Bourke and Ratnieks, 1999), whereas another reached the conclusion that there
is no conflict (Bourke and Chan, 1999). Pamilo (1991) found that the queen
favours a higher investment in colony growth than workers because queens
value the survival of the colony more than workers (survival being higher
with greater investment in workers). Workers, on the other hand, would ben-
efit more than queens from investing in gyne production because they are
more closely related to female sexuals than are queens. Pamilo’s explanation
is surprising because his model did not include competition among colonies.
Moreover, both queens and workers should benefit most from queen-derived
sexual offspring compared to less related second-generation offspring (Bourke
and Chan, 1999). Similarly, Bourke and Ratnieks (1999) suggested that queen
and workers should be in conflict over caste determination of individual female
larvae. In their analysis the authors assumed that per-worker productivity de-
clines with increased colony size and they graphically determined at which
colony size each party switches preference from raising larvae as workers to
raising them as gynes. Workers were found to favour a switch to gyne pro-
duction at a smaller colony size than the queen. This is because workers are
more closely related to the larvae and thus the fitness gained from producing
sexual sisters outweighs the benefits of increased overall production.
A detailed analysis of these two studies provides an explanation of why they
predict a queen-worker conflict. To derive the ESS, Pamilo (1991, Eq. 13) com-
pared for each party the inclusive fitness gained from investing into workers
versus gynes. This is exactly the trade-off that occurs when diploid eggs are
limited, in which case workers have to decrease the investment in workers to
bias sex allocation towards more females. The same is true for the analysis
of Bourke and Ratnieks (1999), because they considered the specific option
to direct a female larva into the gyne versus worker developmental pathway.
Hence, the different queen and worker optima stem from the decision ulti-
mately affecting colony sex allocation. By contrast, the model by Bourke and
Chan (1999) assumes a trade-off between worker production versus colony pro-
ductivity of sexuals (males and females) without assuming any effect of this
trade-off on sex allocation. Our model shows that this is what occurs when
a single party has full control over colony sex allocation and this is why they
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found that queens and workers agree on the amount of resources to be directed
in worker production.
Larval self-determination
Our model shows that female larvae and adult colony members are generally
in strong conflict over caste determination, confirming and generalizing ear-
lier analyses (Nonacs and Tobin, 1992; Bourke and Ratnieks, 1999). With
monandry and monogyny, there is a wide range of conditions where female
larvae benefit from becoming gynes, whereas queens and workers would pre-
fer them to develop into workers. For more complex kin structure (polygyny
and polyandry), the conflict is even stronger and the investment into workers
lower, the predicted value being zero under a wide range of conditions. How-
ever, the prediction of no larvae developing into workers has to be considered
with caution because it is dependent of the specific relationship between per
worker productivity and colony size that was chosen. Moreover, our model
does not include seasonal variation in the probability for gynes to successfully
disperse and initiate new colonies. This may be an important factor with, for
example, female larvae being more likely to develop into workers when the
expected chances of successful dispersal are low.
The demonstration of a strong difference in interest between female larvae
and adult individuals raises the question of who is in control of caste deter-
mination. In many species caste determination is influenced by the amount
and type of food provided to larvae (Wheeler, 1986), suggesting that workers,
which are usually the individuals that feed the larvae, should have a strong
influence on caste determination. However, there are several means by which
female larvae may gain some control over their developmental fate. First, in
some species, larvae probably can influence the amount of resource they ob-
tain and hence increase their probability of developing into a gyne (Bourke
and Ratnieks, 1999). For example, in pocket-making bumblebees larvae feed
autonomously in communal mass-provisioned cells (Michener, 1974; Bourke
and Ratnieks, 1999). Strong competition among larvae indeed seems to occur
whereby larvae occupying a central position in the communal cell monopo-
lise food and develop more frequently into gynes than larvae in the periphery
(Michener, 1974). Furthermore, workers of the pocket-making bumblebees are
more variable in size than workers of pollen-storer species which rear larvae
in individual cells continuously provisioned by workers (Michener, 1974). The
greater variance could stem from larvae’s attempts to acquire more resources
in order to trigger gyne development.
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An alternative route to gyne development is to decrease the caste threshold
[the size at which gyne development is triggered (Wheeler, 1986)], thus allow-
ing development into a gyne with less resources than normally required. A
reduction in gyne size and caste threshold has apparently evolved in parasitic
ants (Nonacs and Tobin, 1992; Aron et al., 1999). In these species female lar-
vae are under strong selection to develop into gynes because the worker tasks
are performed by the host workers and worker development therefore offers
only a relatively small fitness gain for parasite larvae. Reduction of queen size
has also been documented in several non-parasitic Hymenoptera (Michener,
1974; Brian, 1983). Queens of reduced size (microgynes) occur for example in
the bee Trigona julianii (Michener, 1974). Interestingly, in this species queens
are usually produced in special cells but microgynes develop from workers cells
(Michener, 1974). This suggests that reduced size is the only way for a female
to develop into a gyne when in a worker cell. Microgynes have also been found
in several ants. However, it is yet unclear whether the smaller size of these
microgynes has evolved as part of a selfish strategy to increase the probability
of developing into a gyne or is the result of alternative reproductive strategies
(Bourke and Franks, 1995).
Finally, when a larva cannot modify the rate of food intake nor reduce size
and caste threshold, another option is to increase its developmental time. How-
ever, it is unclear whether workers may counteract such selfish larval strategies,
for example by reducing the amount of food provided to larvae or being aggres-
sive towards them. Workers of some Myrmica species have for instance been
reported to provide less food to overwintering than to spring larvae (Brian,
1983). Aggression towards larvae developing into gynes has been reported in
several ant species (Fletcher, 1986; Vargo and Passera, 1991). The differential
treatment of gyne-inclined larvae by workers may represent means to induce
larvae to develop into workers.
Identity of the controlling parties
Our model makes predictions which may allow to test which party controls
reproductive decisions in the colony. It predicts that the relative investment in
workers should (i) decrease with increased levels of polygyny and polyandry if
larvae can influence their developmental fate, (ii) not be affected by the levels
of polygyny and polyandry if either workers or queens are in full control of
resource allocation, and (iii) increase with increased levels of polygyny and
polyandry if workers and queens share control over resource allocation. These
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predictions can be tested by comparing the size of colonies varying in their
kin structure because differences in the relative investment in workers should
translate in size differences between mature colonies. Evidence for a lack
of a relationship between colony size and kin structure comes from two ant
species, Formica truncorum (Sundstro¨m and Ratnieks, 1998) and F. exsecta
(Sundstro¨m et al., 1996). In both species queens can mate singly or multiply,
but colony size is apparently not associated with queen mating frequency.
Interestingly, two lines of evidence suggest that workers may indeed have full
control over resource allocation in these two species. First, the population
wide sex investment ratio is very close to the workers’ optimum (Sundstro¨m,
1994; Sundstro¨m et al., 1996). Second, workers seem also to have control of
reproductive decisions at the colony level because they produce the sex to
which they are more related compared to the population average, as predicted
by split sex ratio theory (Boomsma and Grafen, 1990, 1991). That is, colonies
produce mostly females when the queen is singly mated and males when the
queen is multiply mated (Sundstro¨m, 1994; Sundstro¨m et al., 1996). Workers
seem to attain their preferred sex allocation by selectively eliminating males
in colonies headed by singly mated queens (Sundstro¨m et al., 1996).
In the recent literature, queen control over sex allocation is usually in-
directly inferred from an even sex allocation (e.g. Helms, 1999). However,
no attempts are made to empirically investigate proximate the mechanisms
of queen control that would present an alternative to the fallen paradigm of
pheromonal queen control. The lack of empirical tests is surprising given that
several authors have proposed the idea that queens may prevent workers from
biasing sex allocation towards females by limiting the number of diploid eggs
laid (Bulmer and Taylor, 1981; Ratnieks and Reeve, 1992, this study). Further-
more, the ability of queens to equilibrate the sex investment ratio by limiting
diploid eggs is predicted to be lower in species with well marked gyne-worker
dimorphism (Bulmer and Taylor, 1981), because in species with costly gynes
even a low number of eggs raised as gynes represents a high investment in fe-
male sexuals. Thus, a higher investment in gynes does not come at the cost of
a significant decrease in colony productivity due to lower worker production.
The predicted association between gyne-worker dimorphism and queen’s
ability to manipulate colony sex allocation is intriguing because it may pro-
vide an explanation for the observed positive correlation between sexual di-
morphism and female bias across ant species. Boomsma (1989) first noted
the existence of this association and suggested that it might be due to a
methodological artefact with female bias in sex investment ratio tending to be
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increasingly overestimated as sexual dimorphism increases (see also Boomsma
et al., 1995). However, the association between sexual dimorphism and female
bias is also predicted if queens limit the number of female eggs because sexual
dimorphism tends to be positively correlated with gyne-worker dimorphism in
ants (L. Keller, unpublished). Hence, queens should have less control over sex
allocation and it should be more female biased in species with greater sexual
dimorphism. Experiments are needed to determine whether queen-worker con-
flict over sex allocation indeed leads to limitation of female eggs and whether
the occurrence of egg limitation is negatively correlated with gyne-worker and
gyne-male dimorphism. If such a negative correlation exists, one would ex-
pect a greater ability of workers to control resource allocation in species with a
greater degree of sexual and gyne-worker dimorphism. This tendency towards
complete worker control should translate into a greater investment in work-
ers and one would thus predict a positive relationship between gyne-worker
dimorphism and colony size, as indeed is the case across species of social Hy-
menoptera (Bourke, 1999). However, there are also other reasons to expect
such an association (Bourke, 1999).
A situation similar to female egg limitation occurs when queens and males
are successful in concealing the sex of the brood in order to resist the work-
ers’ manipulation of colony sex allocation (Nonacs and Carlin, 1990; Nonacs,
1993). If the deception is successful up to a developmental stage at which the
fitness gain of biasing the sex allocation does not compensate for the loss of
the energy already invested in rearing the males, the workers are forced to
raise offspring in the sex ratio produced by the queen (Nonacs and Carlin,
1990; Chapuisat et al., 1997). Under such conditions, the only reproductive
decision possibly remaining under the control of the workers is the proportion
of females developing into gynes versus workers, given that female caste can
be influenced beyond the point where brood sex becomes apparent. There is
limited evidence that sexual deception may occur in ants (Nonacs and Carlin,
1990; Chapuisat et al., 1997), but well-designed experiments still need to be
conducted to unambiguously demonstrate its occurrence.
Conclusion
This study explicitly delineates the conditions under which there is a conflict
between queens, workers and larvae over resource allocation to the production
of workers, gynes, and males. It makes predictions about how variation in
queen number and queen mating frequency should affect worker production
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depending on which party controls resource allocation. Our model also inte-
grates key life-history parameters in sex allocation theory which will hopefully
stimulate more empirical research on the strategies pursued by queens, work-
ers, and female brood to maximise their inclusive fitness. These studies would
help to broaden our understanding of the factors shaping the life-history of
hymenopteran colonies and may provide explanations for many examples of
observed sex allocation patterns that cannot be accounted for by the models
of sex ratio theory available so far (Bourke and Franks, 1995; Crozier and
Pamilo, 1996; Chapuisat and Keller, 1999).
Summary
The best known of the conflicts occurring in eusocial Hymenoptera is queen-
worker conflict over sex ratio. So far, sex ratio theory has mostly focussed on
optimal investment in the production of male versus female sexuals, neglecting
the investment in workers. Increased investment in workers decreases imme-
diate sexual productivity but increases expected future colony productivity.
Thus, an important question is to determine the queen’s and workers’ opti-
mal investment in each of the three castes (workers, female and male sexuals),
taking into account a possible trade-off between production of female sexuals
and workers (both castes developing from diploid female eggs). Here, we con-
struct a simple and general kin selection model that allows to calculate the
evolutionary stable investments in the three castes, while varying the identity
of the party controlling resource allocation (relative investment in workers,
female sexuals, and male sexuals). Our model shows that queens and workers
favor the investment in workers that maximises lifetime colony productivity
of sexuals, whatever the colony kin structure. However, worker production is
predicted to be at this optimum only if one of the two parties has complete
control over resource allocation, a situation which is evolutionary unstable
because it strongly selects the other party to manipulate sex allocation in its
favor. Queens are selected to force workers to raise all the males limiting the
number off eggs they lay, whereas workers should respond to egg limitation
by raising a greater proportion of the female eggs into sexuals as a means to
attain a more female-biased sex allocation. This tug-of-war between queens
and workers leads to a stable equilibrium where sex allocation is between the
queen and worker optima, and the investment in workers below both parties’
optimum. Our model further shows that, under most conditions, female larvae
are in strong conflict with queens and workers over their developmental fate
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because they value more their own reproduction than that of siblings. With
the help of our model we also investigate how variation in queen number and
number of matings per queen affect the level of conflict between queens work-
ers and larvae, and ultimately the allocation of resource in the three castes.
Finally, we make predictions that allow to test which party is in control of sex
allocation and caste determination.
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Chapter 4
Sex ratio and Wolbachia infection
in the ant Formica exsecta
The text of this chapter has been published as: L. Keller, C. Liautard, M.
Reuter, W. D. Brown, L. Sundstro¨m and M. Chapuisat (2001). Sex ratio and
Wolbachia infection in the ant Formica exsecta. Heredity 87: 227-233.
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Introduction
Social Hymenoptera have been key organisms for the study of sex ratio theory
and kin selection (Bourke and Franks, 1995; Crozier and Pamilo, 1996; Bourke,
1997; Queller and Strassmann, 1998; Keller and Chapuisat, 1999; Keller and
Reeve, 1999). The haplodiploid sex determination system (with males arising
from unfertilised eggs and females from fertilised eggs) results in asymmetries
of genetic relatedness among colony members and a parent-offspring conflict
over relative allocation of resources to the two sexes (Trivers and Hare, 1976;
Nonacs, 1986; Bourke and Franks, 1995; Crozier and Pamilo, 1996). Because
queens are equally related to both sexes of reproductives reared in their colony,
their fitness is maximised by an even sex-ratio investment. In contrast, workers
are more related to their sisters than to their brothers, and their inclusive
fitness is maximised by an increased investment in female brood.
Worker control of sex allocation not only leads to a female biased popula-
tion sex ratio, it can also cause variation in sex allocation between colonies
with different kin-structure. Split sex ratio theory (Boomsma and Grafen,
1990) predicts that workers in colonies with a relatedness asymmetry (RA,
here defined as the higher relatedness of workers to females than males in
their colony) above the population average should mainly specialise in the
production of females. In contrast, workers in colonies with a RA below the
average should favour the production of mostly males. Several studies have
confirmed this prediction (Queller and Strassmann, 1998). For example, in
single-queen colonies of Formica truncorum and F. exsecta, nests headed by
singly mated queens produce mostly females, whereas nests headed by multi-
ply mated queens specialise on male production (Sundstro¨m, 1994; Sundstro¨m
et al., 1996). However, in both species a large part of the variance in sex allo-
cation is not explained by variation in relatedness asymmetry. Furthermore,
in a population of F. exsecta with multiple queens per nest and in several
other species, split sex ratios occurs but colony sex ratios are not correlated
with relatedness asymmetry (Keller and Chapuisat, 1999; Helms, 1999; Brown
and Keller, 2000). This suggests that other factors also influence colony sex
allocation. One of the potential factors accounting for variations in colony
sex ratio is the amount and type of resources available, possibly because it
affects the relative cost of production of males and females (Rosenheim et al.,
1996). In some species, variations in resource supply apparently affect sex
ratio specialisation (e.g. Deslippe and Savolainen, 1995).
Recently, it has also been suggested that maternally inherited bacteria may
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have an influence on sex allocation in social Hymenoptera (Crozier and Pamilo,
1993; Bourke and Franks, 1995; Crozier and Pamilo, 1996; Wenseleers and
Billen, 2000). Wolbachia, a group of intracellular bacteria related to Rick-
ettsiae, stand as one of the most likely candidate organism that may affect sex
ratios. These bacteria are known to infect Hymenoptera and other arthropods,
particularly their reproductive tissues (Rousset et al., 1992a; Werren, 1997).
They are transmitted through the egg cytoplasm and alter reproduction in
their host in various ways. In particular, they are associated with induction
of parthenogenesis, cytoplasmic incompatibility, feminisation of genetic males
and male killing. Because Wolbachia are transmitted through females but not
males, they would benefit by manipulating their host colony to produce only
female sexuals and no males because males are a reproductive dead end for the
bacteria. If Wolbachia can bias colony sex ratios but not all colonies are in-
fected, split sex ratio could arise. Colonies bearing Wolbachia would produce
only or predominantly females, whereas uninfected colonies would specialise
on males to reduce the sex ratio bias at the population level.
The aim of this study is to determine whether Wolbachia infection is as-
sociated with variation in colony sex ratios in the ant Formica exsecta. This
species has been extensively studied with regard to sex allocation and a prelim-
inary study indicated that it harbours Wolbachia. Split sex ratios have been
reported from two different populations that differ in their social organisation.
In a Finnish population where colonies contain a single queen (monogyny),
the population sex ratio investment was female biased; most colonies headed
by a singly-mated queen specialised in female production, whereas colonies
headed by a multiply mated queen specialised in the production of males
(Sundstro¨m et al., 1996). These results are consistent with the idea that
colony sex ratios are under the control of workers. By contrast, it seems
unlikely thatWolbachia could be responsible for the association between queen
mating frequency and colony sex ratios because there is no obvious reason why
singly-mated queens should be more likely to be infected by Wolbachia.
The other study population, which is located in Switzerland, contains
colonies which typically contain numerous queens (polygyny). In contrast
to the Finnish population, no association between relatedness asymmetry and
sex allocation was detected in the Swiss population. In that population sex
ratio was highly male biased and only a minority of nests (11%) produced
females (Brown and Keller, 2000, Brown and Keller submitted).
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We used a PCR assay to determine the prevalence of Wolbachia in workers
from colonies specialising in male and female production in both the Swiss
and Finnish populations. We used the same colonies that had been used in
previous sex ratio studies to determine whether previous conclusions on factors
affecting sex ratio might have been confounded by the presence of Wolbachia.
Materials and Methods
Colony sampling
Our study included individuals from 71 F. exsecta colonies. All these colonies
had been part of earlier genetic and sex ratio studies (Sundstro¨m et al., 1996;
Chapuisat et al., 1997; Brown and Keller, 2000).
We analysed 40 nests in a Swiss polygynous population. Half of the colonies
were male producing and the other half were female producing following the
criteria of Brown and Keller (2000). All samples analysed were adult workers.
We analysed 31 nests from a Finnish monogynous population. Colony sex
ratios were obtained from Sundstro¨m et al. (1996). We classified colonies as
male producing if they produced more than 75%males and as female producing
if they produced more than 63% queens. For our study, we chose 17 female-
producing and 14 male-producing nests. The age of the workers analysed
varied between colonies. DNA had been extracted from adult workers in 14
of these colonies and worker pupae for the other 17 colonies. There was no
significant association between the type of material analysed and colony sex
ratio (Fisher’s exact test, P = 0.07).
Wolbachia detection
We tested for the presence of Wolbachia in five workers from each of the se-
lected colonies. Wolbachia-infection was detected by PCR-amplifying a frag-
ment of the cell cycle gene FtsZ using Wolbachia specific primers. Primer
sequences and PCR conditions are given in Wenseleers et al. (1998). A previ-
ous analysis (unpublished) showed that only the strain A was present in the
Swiss population of F. exsecta. Thus, PCRs for this study were performed
with primers specific for the strain A. PCR products were run on 2% agarose
gels and visualised by ethidium bromide staining. Each sample was analysed
twice and individuals were considered infected when positive for at least one
of the PCRs.
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We took several precautions to avoid artefacts in the Wolbachia screening.
For each PCR, we used a positive as well as a negative control. The positive
control was an individual known to carry Wolbachia. In the negative control,
DNA was replaced by de-ionised water. Further, to avoid any bias of our
results due to PCR conditions and/or loading effect, we alternated female- and
male-producing nests in PCRs and migrations on agarose gel. Thus, in each
PCR and on each gel, half of the individuals were from a female producing
and the other half from a male producing nest. Finally, we could exclude
false negatives due to problems during DNA extraction because all samples
had previously been part of microsatellite analysis and were known to contain
DNA.
Statistical analysis
Because our two samples differed with respect to locality, social organisation,
and the type of material used, we performed separate statistical analysis on
the data from Switzerland and Finland. We analysed the data using a gener-
alised linear model (GLM) with a binomially distributed error and a logistic
link function. Presence or absence of infection in individual workers was the
dependent variable. For analysing the Swiss data, we entered the colony sex
ratio (male-producing or female-producing) and colony nested within sex ratio
as independent variables. For the Finnish data, we entered colony sex ratio,
the material used (adult workers or pupae), the interaction of these two vari-
ables, as well as colony nested within sex ratio and material. The significance
of factors was tested with Chi-squared tests. All analyses were performed with
S-Plus 2000 (MathSoft Inc.).
Results
Our PCR method for detecting Wolbachia was reasonably reliable. In the
Finnish population, 95 individuals (61%) were scored as infected for the two
PCRs, 11 (7%) as infected once and 49 (32%) as never infected. Similar values
were found in the Swiss population, with 96 (47%), 25 (13%) and 79 (40%)
individuals being scored as being infected twice, once and never, respectively.
Overall, repeated PCR amplifications gave the same result for 120 (87%) of
the individuals analysed. The repeatability r of the PCR results, measured
as the proportion of between-individual variance among the total variance of
PCR results (Falconer and Mackay, 1996) was r = 0.86 and r = 0.77 for the
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Figure 4.1: Number of infected workers in male- and female-producing colonies
in the Swiss and the Finish population. The x-axis gives the number infected
workers per colony (out of the five analysed). The y-axis gives the number of
colonies with a given number of infected workers. For the Finish population,
data on worker pupae are given in light grey, those on adult workers in black.
In the Swiss population all individuals analysed were adult workers.
Swiss and the Finnish populations, respectively.
Most of the colonies contained some infected workers (Figure 4.1). In only
four Swiss polygynous nests (10.0%) and one Finnish monogynous nest (3.2%),
no infected worker was detected. In both populations there was no significant
association between sex ratio and whether colonies contained infected work-
ers (Switzerland, Fisher’s exact test, P > 0.9; Finland, Fisher exact test,
P > 0.9). The proportion of infected colonies did also not differ significantly
between the two populations (Fisher exact test, P = 0.38). The overall per-
centage of colonies without infected workers was 7.0%. The percentage of
individuals infected was similar in the two populations. Sixty and 69% of the
workers were scored as infected in the Swiss and Finnish populations, respec-
tively.
Results from the GLM analyses are presented in Table 4.1. The analyses
revealed that the factor that had the greatest influence on the proportion of
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Table 4.1: Results from the GLM analyses for the Finnish and the Swiss pop-
ulation. The dependent variable in both analyses was the infection status of
workers (infected/uninfected). The table shows the independent variables en-
tered in the analysis (Factor), the number of their degrees of freedom (df), and
their significance calculated by a Chi-squared test. Further, the percentage of
the total variance explained the significant factors is given (Explained V).
Factor d.f. P Explained V
Finland
Sex ratio 1 > 0.5 —
Material 1 0.0014 5.2%
Sex ratio x Material 1 0.2 —
Colony in (Sex ratio x Material) 27 < 0.0001 39.3%
Switzerland
Sex ratio 1 0.0088 2.6%
Colony in Sex ratio 27 < 0.0001 58.1%
infected workers was the colony from which workers were sampled. The effect
of colony was significant in both populations and explained as much as 58 and
39% of the variance in the Swiss and Finnish populations, respectively.
Overall, there was no clear association between sex ratio and the propor-
tion of infected workers (Table 4.1). In the Swiss population, sex ratio was
significantly associated with the proportion of infected workers but sex ra-
tio explained only 2.6% of the total variance in the proportion of infected
workers. Interestingly, the association was opposite to theoretical expec-
tations if Wolbachia manipulated their host to increase their transmission
rate. Female-producing colonies tended to have a lower number of infected
workers (2.6 ± 2.0/1.5; mean ± SD / median) than male-producing colonies
(3.5±1.9/4.5). In the Finnish population, there was no significant association
between these two variables and the number of infected workers was quite
similar in female- (3.5± 1.7/4.0) and male- (3.4± 1.6/4.0) producing colonies
(Fig. 4.2).
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In the Finnish population, there was a significant association between the
proportion of infected workers and the type of material analysed (Table 4.1).
The proportion of infected individuals was higher for pupae than workers,
both in female- and male-producing colonies (Fig. 4.2). Overall, the type of
material explained 5.2% of the total variance in the proportion of infected
workers in Finland.
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Figure 4.2: Mean ± SE number of infected workers (out of the five analysed)
in male- and female-producing colonies (M, F). Data are given separately for
adult workers in the Swiss population (black circles), adult workers (white
circles) and worker pupae (squares) in the Finish population.
Discussion
Our data indicate that, in both the Swiss polygynous and Finnish monogynous
populations, almost all colonies are infected with Wolbachia. Overall, only 7%
of the colonies contained no infected workers. In the Finnish monogynous
population, although only five individuals were analysed per colony, only one
of the 31 colonies had no infected workers, indicating that the large majority
or even all the reproductive queens are infected. In the Swiss population it is
more difficult to determine the proportion of infected queens because colonies
can contain large number of queens and it is impossible to accurately assign
maternity of workers in such colonies. However, the finding that the average
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proportion of infected workers is similar in both populations is suggestive
that the proportion of infected reproductive queens might be similar in both
populations, with perhaps all queens being infected.
The very high proportion of infected queens suggests that Wolbachia have
efficient means to spread through the population. One very efficient mecha-
nism favouring the spread of Wolbachia is cytoplasmic incompatibility, which
occurs when an uninfected female mates with an infected male (Breeuwer and
Werren, 1990; Hoffmann and Turelli, 1997). Such matings generally produce
few or no female progeny as the result of abortive karyogamy (Lassy and Karr,
1996). Because the other possible types of matings yield normal progeny num-
bers, the outcome of cytoplasmic incompatibility is lower fitness of uninfected
females compared to infected females. This reproductive advantage of infected
females results in the spread of Wolbachia through a population (Caspari and
Watson, 1959; Turelli, 1994). Interestingly, the spread of Wolbachia through
cytoplasmic incompatibility should be even quicker in social Hymenoptera
than in solitary species because uninfected females mated with infected males
should produce few or no female workers (Vavre et al., 2000), and hence are
unlikely to be successful in founding a new colony. More studies are needed
to test whether the high prevalence of Wolbachia in F. exsecta is indeed due
to the effect of cytoplasmic incompatibility.
In the Swiss population the prevalence of Wolbachia was slightly higher
in male than female producing colonies. By contrast, there was no signifi-
cant association between these two factors in the Finnish population. It is
important to note that the association between colony type and prevalence of
Wolbachia in the Swiss population was weak (sex ratio explained only 2.6% of
the variance). Moreover, the association was opposite to what one would pre-
dict if Wolbachia altered colony sex ratios so as to increase their transmission
rate. Thus, it seems likely that the weak but significant association between
colony type and prevalence of Wolbachia is not due to an active manipula-
tion of colony sex ratio by the parasite but rather results from the effect of a
confounding ecological variable that affects both sex allocation and Wolbachia
infection.
That ecological variables or intrinsic factors can affect the proportion of
infected individuals is suggested by the higher proportion of infected worker
pupae than worker adults in Finland. The higher prevalence of Wolbachia in
pupae suggests that some workers loose infection with age or that the bacte-
rial density decreases to levels undetectable with standard PCR methods, a
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result that may partially be explained by differences in the amount of fresh
tissue between adults and pupae. A lower proportion of infected adult workers
compared to worker pupae has also been found in another ant, Formica trun-
corum (Wenseleers et al., 2002). The reasons underlying decreased proportion
of infected workers with age are unknown. One possible explanation is that
endoparasites are not selected to proliferate in workers that will never produce
any female offspring (selection would even be negative if infection decreases
worker efficiency, thus overall colony productivity). Alternatively, the propor-
tion of infected workers may decrease as a result of the possible exposure of
adult workers to higher temperature. Increased temperature has been shown
to decrease the density of Wolbachia in Drosophila bifasciata (Hurst et al.,
2000). Thus, adult workers exposed to higher temperature while foraging may
experience a decrease in the density of Wolbachia. It is also possible that
differences in temperature (or other ecological variables) influence resource
availability and thereby colony sex ratios, which might explain the weak as-
sociation between these two variables in the Swiss population. Alternatively,
female-producing colonies might be comprised of older workers, which would
also account for an association between the proportion of infected workers and
colony sex ratios.
The finding of no clear association between prevalence of Wolbachia and
colony sex ratios together with the fact that all or almost all queens are infected
indicate that sex ratio specialisation in F. exsecta colonies cannot simply be
accounted for by the presence or absence of Wolbachia. In particular, the
finding that colonies with more infected workers tend to produce males in the
Swiss populations indicates that Wolbachia do not manipulate their host into
producing mostly or only females. Moreover, Wolbachia was as prevalent in
the Swiss population, which has a male-biased population sex ratio, as in the
Finnish population which shows a female-biased sex ratio.
There are several possible explanations for the apparent lack of sex ra-
tio manipulation by Wolbachia in F. exsecta. One is proximate constraints
arising from the mechanism of sex determination in ants (Wenseleers and
Billen, 2000). In most ants, sex is probably determined by heterozygosity at
one or several sex-determination loci with heterozygous individuals develop-
ing into females and homozygous and hemizygous individuals developing into
males (Cook and Crozier, 1995). Because Wolbachia-induced parthenogenesis
generally relies on a cytogenetic mechanism of gamete duplication, yielding
completely homozygous diploid offspring (Stouthamer and Kazmer, 1994) this
would lead to the production of diploid males which are generally sterile. An
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alternative mechanism by which Wolbachia might alter the sex ratio is ma-
nipulation of the proportion of viable fertilised eggs. This could be achieved if
Wolbachia could decrease viability of haploid eggs or influence the mechanism
of egg fertilisation. In Nasonia vitripennis a maternal-sex ratio distorter ap-
parently induces a higher than normal frequency of egg fertilisation (Skinner,
1982). However, such an effect has not yet been reported for Wolbachia (in
ants a possible mechanism could be by acting on the muscles regulating trans-
fer of sperm from the queen spermatheca to the eggs). Additional studies in
other ants would be helpful to ascertain whether Wolbachia generally has no
effect on ant sex ratios. Studies of populations where Wolbachia has not yet
spread to fixation would be particularly interesting asWolbachia might have a
greater effect on sex ratio variation between colonies in such non-equilibrium
situation.
Summary
Sex allocation data in social Hymenoptera provide some of the best tests of
kin selection, parent-offspring conflict and sex ratio theories. However, these
studies critically depend on controlling for confounded ecological factors and
on identifying all parties that potentially manipulate colony sex ratio. It has
been suggested that maternally inherited parasites may influence sex allocation
in social Hymenoptera. If the parasites can influence sex allocation, infected
colonies are predicted to invest more resources in females than non-infected
colonies, because the parasites are transmitted through females but not males.
Prime candidates for such sex-ratio manipulation areWolbachia because these
cytoplasmically transmitted bacteria have been shown to affect the sex ratio of
host arthropods by cytoplasmic incompatibility, parthenogenesis, male-killing
and feminisation. In this study, we tested whether Wolbachia infection is as-
sociated with colony sex ratio in two populations of the ant Formica exsecta
that have been the subject of extensive sex ratio studies. In these populations
colonies specialise in the production of one sex or the other. We found that
almost all F. exsecta colonies in both populations are infected with Wolbachia.
However, in neither population did we find a significant association in the pre-
dicted direction between the prevalence of Wolbachia and colony sex ratio. In
particular, colonies with higher proportion of infected workers did not produce
more females. Hence, we conclude that Wolbachia does not seem to alter the
sex ratio of its hosts as a means to increase transmission rate in these two
populations of ants.
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Introduction
Wolbachia are probably the most successful bacterial symbionts in nature, es-
timated to be present in 20-75 percent of arthropods species. Wolbachia are
intracellular symbionts belonging to the alpha-proteobacterian group Rick-
ettsiae. As cytoplasmic elements, their predominant mode of transmission is
vertical. Along with mitochondria they are passed from the mother to the
offspring. Paternal transmission through sperm is probably very rare (Turelli
et al., 1992; Turelli and Hoffmann, 1995). Despite their maternal inheritance
within host populations, Wolbachia’s spread between host species seems to
rely on horizontal transmission. Accordingly, the phylogeny of Wolbachia dif-
fers markedly from that of its hosts (Werren et al., 1995a,b; O’Neill et al.,
1992; Rousset et al., 1992a; Cook and Butcher, 1999).
Wolbachia can not only be found in a large number of host species, they
also attain a high prevalence within host populations. The spread of infection
is promoted by symbiont-induced alterations of host reproductive physiology.
Four different symbiont effects, called phenotypes, have been described in
Arthropods (see Werren, 1997). All of these increase infection frequency by
assuring that the number of infected daughters produced by an infected female
exceeds the average production of daughters per female. Three phenotypes
achieve this goal by increasing the proportion of females among an infected
mother’s offspring, either by causing genetic sons to develop into functional
daughters (feminisation phenotype), inducing parthenogenetic reproduction in
the mother (parthenogenesis induction), or by provoking the selective abortion
of sons (male-killing). The latter increases survival of female offspring in
species with sib competition for resources. The forth phenotype, cytoplasmic
incompatibility (CI), renders matings between infected males and uninfected
females partly sterile. Incompatible matings promote the spread of Wolbachia
infection because they lower the expected productivity of uninfected females
as compared to infected females, the latter reproducing normally with both
infected and uninfected males.
The spread of a CI-inducing Wolbachia through a host population depends
on intrinsic properties of the symbiont strain and/or host-symbiont interac-
tions, such as the degree of incompatibility caused by the symbiont or its ef-
fects on host fitness (Caspari and Watson, 1959; Hoffmann and Turelli, 1997).
In addition, the dispersal behaviour of the host is expected to play an im-
portant role for infection dynamics in discontinuous host populations. Hosts
dispersal has a direct impact on the frequency of incompatible matings and
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dispersal of female hosts also mediates the transfer of symbionts between sub-
populations. Of special interest are therefore Wolbachia infections in host
species where dispersal rates are reduced, such as the ant Formica exsecta.
A population of these ants, situated in the Swiss Jura mountains, has been
shown to harbourWolbachia (Chapter 4). The symbionts most probably cause
the CI phenotype, because despite being infected, most colonies produce ex-
clusively male sexuals. Moreover, contrary to what would be expected with
all other phenotypes, the sex ratio of sexual offspring produced is not corre-
lated with Wolbachia prevalence within colonies (Chapter 4). A population
genetic study of the host population revealed that dispersal of ant queens oc-
curs at very low rates (Liautard and Keller, 2001). The ant population covers
several forest clearings, which form distinct sub-populations. Mitochondrial
genetic markers are highly differentiated between these sub-populations, most
of which contain ants with an identical haplotype. In the few sub-populations
where several haplotypes co-occur, these are clustered locally. This indicates
that also within sub-populations dispersal occurs at a small local scale. The
present study revealed high levels of multiple Wolbachia infection in the ant
population, with all ants carrying between four and five different Wolbachia
lineages. Hosts varied in the number of strains they carried, because one
Wolbachia strain was exclusively associated with three host mitochondrial
haplotypes while lacking in the two remaining mitochondrial lineages. This
difference in infection between haplotypic lineages was independent of locality
and could be detected even between ants sampled from the same population.
Finally, an analysis of the wsp gene sequences of the Wolbachia strains carried
by F. exsecta revealed that three of the five strains are most probably the
result of homologous recombination.
Material and Methods
We used DNA samples that had already been employed by Liautard and Keller
(2001). For their study, workers had been collected in different nests from nine
locations within the Swiss population of F. exsecta. DNA of the ants had been
extracted following a standard salt extraction protocol. With the help of three
RFLP markers within the cytochrome B and ND2 genes Liautard and Keller
(2001) had determined the mitochondrial haplotypes of the workers.
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Table 5.1: Results of RFLP analysis. The table gives for each individual
the haplotype, the locality and nest of origin. Wolbachia lines detected are
indicated by a cross (X). Bold face indicates individuals used for sequencing
of Wolbachia.
Haplotype Locality Nest wFex1 wFex2 wFex3 wFex4 wFex5
Hap1 BA 2 - X X X X
Hap1 BA 4 - X X X X
Hap1 BA 10 - X X X X
Hap1 DU 1 - X X X X
Hap1 DU 5 - X X X X
Hap1 PJ 1 - X X X X
Hap1 PJ 6 - X X X X
Hap1 Chen 8 - X X X X
Hap1 Chen 74 - X X X X
Hap1 Chen 213 - X X X X
Hap2 BB 2 X X X X X
Hap2 BB 6 X X X X X
Hap2 BB 10 X X X X X
Hap2 PN 1 X X X X X
Hap2 PN 5 X X X X X
Hap2 PN 8 X X X X X
Hap2 ROC 3 X X X X X
Hap2 ROC 7 X X X X X
Hap2 ROC 10 X X X X X
Hap3 PJ 3 - X X X X
Hap3 PJ 4 - X X X X
Hap3 PJ 7 - X X X X
Hap3 LO 1 - X X X X
Hap3 LO 2 - X X X X
Hap3 LO 6 - X X X X
Hap4 PN 1 X X X X X
Hap4 PN 2 X X X X X
Hap6 LC 1 X X X X X
Hap6 LC 5 X X X X X
Hap6 LC 8 X X X X X
Hap6 LO 3 X X X X X
Hap6 LO 4 X X X X X
Hap6 LO 5 X X X X X
Hap6 PN 9 X X X X X
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Sequencing
In order to obtain an overview of the Wolbachia lineages occurring in the ant
population, we first sequenced the wsp gene of Wolbachia harboured in indi-
viduals with different mitochondrial haplotypes. Based on data from Liautard
and Keller (2001) we chose one individual with from each of the haplotypes
Hap1, Hap2, Hap3, Hap4, and Hap6 (Tab. 5.1, individuals in bold face). A
sixth haplotype reported by Liautard and Keller (Hap8) occurred only in a
very small number of individuals from a single sub-population and was not
considered here. While choosing the samples, care was taken to use individu-
als from different localities. Wherever possible, individuals were chosen from
sub-population in which one haplotype was fixed (Hap1 from sub-population
BA, Hap2 from BB, Hap6 from LC; see Liautard and Keller (2001) for more
details about the locations). Haplotypes Hap3 and Hap4 are fixed in none of
the sub-populations investigated by Liautard and Keller. We therefore chose
individuals from the location where the haplotype was represented in the high-
est proportion (Hap3 from sub-population PJ, Hap4 from PN).
In order to sequence the wsp gene from individual Wolbachia within the
hosts, the gene was amplified from the extractions of ant DNA using primers
wsp 81F and wsp 691R (Braig et al., 1998) and following the protocol by Zhou
et al. (1998). The PCR product was run on 1.5% agarose gels and visualised
by staining with SYBR Gold (Molecular Probes). Individual bands were cut
out of the gel and frozen at -20◦C. DNA was recovered out of the thawed gel
slices by spinning in a table-top centrifuge at maximum speed for about five
minutes and cloned using a TOPO TA Cloning Kit with TOP 10 One Shot
chemically competent cells (Invitrogen). E. coli colonies were selected if the
wsp gene could be successfully amplified out of the plasmids using the same
PCR conditions as the initial amplification. Bacteria from selected colonies
were grown over-night in liquid LB medium containing ampicillin and the plas-
mid was recovered with the Wizard Plus SV Minipreps DNA Purification Sys-
tem (Promega). Sequencing reactions were performed in one or both forward
and reverse directions using the ABI BigDye Terminator Cycle Sequencing Kit
(Applied Biosystems) and run on an ABI 377 automated sequencer. Forward
and reverse sequences from same clones were aligned and corrected by hand
in order to obtain an unambiguous sequence for each clone. We sequenced
between 12 and 14 clones per host individual, i.e., a total of 65 clones.
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Sequence analysis
Sequences were aligned by eye in Se-Al (A. Rambaut, evolve.zoo.ox.ac/software)
while taking into account their amino acid translation. Analyses of sequence
divergence were performed using PAUP 4.0b8 (D. L. Swofford). To test
the statistical significance of the recombination events we identified in our
data, we employed a maximum likelihood method developed by Holmes et al.
(1999). The test determines the probability of a recombination event in a
set of three sequences, a recombinant and two putative ”parents”. A statis-
tical parameter is calculated based on maximum likelihood tree construction.
This parameter is compared to a null distribution obtained by applying the
test to sequence sets generated by simulating clonal evolution (excluding re-
combination) under the same maximum likelihood model as that used for
the original test. We performed the test with the program LARD (Holmes
et al., 1999, evolve.zoo.ox.ac/software), the null distribution was generated
by simulating 200 sequence sets with Seq-Gen (Rambaut and Grassly, 1997,
evolve.zoo.ox.ac/software). The maximum likelihood estimations of phyloge-
netic parameters needed for the test and generation of the null distribution
were obtained by applying a HKY85 model (Hasegawa et al., 1985) including
gamma-distributed rate heterogeneity between sites to the ensemble of our
sequences in PAUP version 4.0b8 (D. L. Swofford).
RFLP genotyping
In order to verify whether the Wolbachia lineages identified by sequencing
were differentially associated with host mitochondrial haplotypes, we used
RFLP to detect Wolbachia lineages in a larger sample of ants. For each of the
haplotypes Hap1, Hap2, Hap3, Hap4, and Hap6 we analysed ants from several
nests from all localities where that haplotype occurred. The sampling scheme
is summarised in Table 5.1.
Two enzymes, RsaI and HindIII, cut wsp sequences of the different Wol-
bachia lineages in a way that produced one specific band for each lineage. For
RFLP analysis, the wsp gene was amplified with primers wsp 81F and wsp
691R. The reaction was carried out in a volume of 50µl, containing, 0.5µM of
both primers, 250µM of each nucleotide, 2.5mM of MgCl2, 1.25U of SuperTag
Plus (HT Biotechnology), 1x buffer, and 8µl of DNA extract. The PCR tem-
perature profile consisted of an initial denturation at 92◦C for three minutes,
thirty cycles of 30 seconds denaturation at 92◦C, 1 minute of annealing at
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55◦C, and 1 minute of extension at 68◦C, followed by a final extension of 5
minutes at 68◦C. PCR products were purified with QiaQuick spin columns
(Qiagen) and re-suspended in 30µl sterile water. The whole amplified DNA
was digested in 50µl containing 3.3U RsaI (Appligene), 3U HindIII (Gibco),
and 1x buffer 2 (Gibco). Digestion was carried out at 37◦C during two hours.
Fragments were run on a high resolution gel Spreadex EL1200 (Elchrom Sci-
entific) at 55◦C and 10V/cm during 70 minutes. Gels were stained with SYBR
Gold (Molecular Probes) and destained in water before photographing.
Nucl. pos. 102 104 105 107 108 109 110 111 112 115 116 117 118 119 123 126 129 132 139 143 144 146
wFex1 A G C A A G A C A A A T A G C A A A A C T G
wFex2 A A C G T A G T G T A C A G A A G G A C T G
wFex3 A A C G T A G T G T A C A G A A G G A C T G
wFex5 G G G C T G A T G G T T G A T T A T C G A T
wFex4 G G G C T G A T G G T T G A T T A T C G A T
Nucl. pos. 147 152 153 156 165 180 183 189 190 198 199 201 204 208 209 210 211 213 216 219 220 224
wFex1 C G T G T C G C G A C T C T G G T G T A G C
wFex2 T G T A C C G T G A G T T T A C C A C A A A
wFex3 T G T A C C G T G A G T T T A C C A C A A A
wFex5 T C C A T T A T A G C A T C A G C A C G A T
wFex4 T C C A T T A T A G C A T C A G C A C G A T
Nucl. pos. 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 233 234 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248
wFex1 A G A T G T A T A G T - - - - - - - - - - -
wFex2 T G T T A C A G T C A A C A T T T A C G C C
wFex3 T G T T A C A G T C A A C A T T T A C G C C
wFex5 G A A C A A T A T A A G T G C T T A C T C C
wFex4 G A A C A A T A T A A G T G C T T A C T C C
Nucl. pos. 249 255 256 261 262 263 264 267 272 285 286 294 307 312 321 348 367 369 372 375 382 383
wFex1 - A G A G A A C C A T C G G C T A T C A G C
wFex2 A T A G A A C T C A C C A A T T A T C A G C
wFex3 A T A G A A C T C A C C A A T C G C T T A A
wFex5 A T G G G G C C A G C T A A T T A T C A G C
wFex4 A T G G G G C C A G C T A A T C G C T T A A
Nucl. pos. 385 386 387 391 393 395 397 405 406 407 416 424 425 434 441 446 450 466 474 489 503 513
wFex1 A C T G G G A T G G C G G G T G C G T C A C
wFex2 A C C A G G A T G G C G G G T G C G T C A C
wFex3 G A A A A A G A A A G T A A G A T A C T G T
wFex5 A C C A G G A T G G C G G G T G C G T C A C
wFex4 G A A A A A G A A A G T A A G A T A C T G T
Nucl. pos. 516 520 521 522 523 525 526 529 530 531 535 537 539 540 546 548 551 552 553 554 559 584
wFex1 T - - - A A A G A C G C G C G A T C A A C C
wFex2 T - - - A A A G A C G C G C G A A C A A C C
wFex3 C A G C G T G A G T A A A T A G A T G C T T
wFex5 T - - - A A A G A C G C G C G A D C A A C C
wFex4 C A G C G T G A G T A A A T A G A T G C T T
Figure 5.1: Figure 1: Sequence variation in the wsp gene of the five Wolbachia
lineages identified in F. exsecta. Position 1 is equivalent to position 386 in the
original wsp sequence by Braig et al. (1998).
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Results
We identified a total of five different Wolbachia strains. The strains have been
named wFex1 wFex5 and their wsp sequences can be accessed on Genbank un-
der the numbers AY101196, AY101197, AY101198, AY101199, and AY101200,
respectively. Blasting the sequences in Genbank identified members of the
Wolbachia A-group as closest matches. Furthermore, blasts revealed that the
wsp sequence of wFex1 is identical to that of aWolbachia carried by the tephri-
tid fruit fly Dacus destillatoria (accession number AF295344) whereas wFex4’s
wsp gene is identical to that of aWolbachia sequenced in the ant Formica trun-
corum (accession number AF326978). The closest match to wFex2 was the wsp
sequence of Wolbachia strain wUni, identified in Muscidifurax uniraptor (ac-
cession number AF020071). However, the wFex2 and wUni differed at almost
three percent of nucleotide positions. For wFex3 and wFex5, no close matches
were found, the most similar sequences differed by 7–8% of nucleotides.
The similarities between the wsp sequences of the five wFex lineages suggest
that three of them have arisen by homologous recombination. Strains wFex3
and wFex5 share large parts of identical sequences with strains wFex2 and
wFex4. As shown in Figure 5.1, the left part of wFex3’s wsp sequence is
identical to that of wFex2, up to a breakpoint situated between nucleotide
positions 321 and 348. To the right of this point, the sequence of wFex3 is
identical to that of wFex4. The wsp sequence of wFex5 shows exactly the
reversed pattern of similarity, with a 5’-part identical to wFex4 and a 3’-part
identical to wFex2. The LARD analysis gave strong statistical support for the
recombinational origin of wsp sequences of wFex3 and wFex5. In tests using
wFex2 and wFex4 as parental taxa and either one of the recombinant strains,
none of 200 simulated sequence sets produced a likelihood ratio greater than
that obtained on the original data sets. This corresponds to a significance level
of P < 0.005. Recombination might also be at the origin of wFex1 or wFex2.
The 3’-parts of their wsp sequences differ by only two nucleotides whereas they
differ by 16% of nucleotides on the 5’-end (nucleotides 1–321). A significance
test for this recombination event could not be performed because of the lack
of a second parental sequence.
The RFLP analyses revealed high levels of multiple Wolbachia infection
(Tab. 1). All ants analysed harboured symbionts from strains wFex2, wFex3,
wFex4, and wFex5. Lineage wFex1 was found in all hosts with mitochondrial
haplotypes Hap2, Hap4, and Hap6 but lacked in all ants with haplotypes Hap1
and Hap3. The variation in infection between haplotypes was completely in-
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dependent of locality. Ants with the same haplotype but sampled in different
nests or sub-population harboured the same symbiont lineages, while individ-
uals from the same locality but belonging to different haplotype groups (Hap1
and Hap3 vs. Hap2, Hap4 and Hap6) differed in infection (Tab. 5.1).
Discussion
Our study revealed high levels of multipleWolbachia infection in the ant F. ex-
secta. All ants were found to harbour four or five Wolbachia strains. This
number is very high compared to other multiply infected hosts, which have
been found to harbour two or three strains. For example, two co-existing
strains have been found in Nasonia vitripennis, N. giraulti, N. longicornis
(Breeuwer et al., 1992), Drosophila simulans (Merc¸ot et al., 1995), Aedes al-
bopictus (Sinkins et al., 1995), and Trichopria sp. (Vavre et al., 1999). Three
Wolbachia strains have so far only been reported from three host species, the
beetle Callosobruchus chinensis (Kondo et al., 2002) and the parasitoid wasps
Leptopilina heterotoma and Asobara tabida (Vavre et al., 1999). It is not clear
what factors are at the origin of the exceptionally high level of multiple in-
fection in F. exsecta. One possibility might be that multiple infection is the
result of repeated invasion of different Wolbachia strains, combined with the
generation of new strains by recombination. The strains wFex1, wFex2, and
wFex4 are more likely to have invaded the ant population, because identical or
very similar Wolbachia strains could be found in other insect species. Strains
wFex3 and wFex5, on the other hand might have arisen subsequently by re-
combination within F. exsecta. The LARD analysis has identified the two
strains as probable recombinants between wFex2 and wFex4. Furthermore, no
close correspondence to the two putative recombinant strains could be found
among the Wolbachia strains for which wsp sequences have been obtained so
far. Although the interpretation of recombination within F. exsecta is consis-
tent with our data, it is impossible to confirm at the present stage. The fact
that Wolbachia strains sharing an identical wsp sequence can be found in very
distant host species makes clear that recombinant strains might equally well
have been generated elsewhere and later have invaded the ant population.
The present study stresses the importance of recombination in generating
new symbiont strains. Although we cannot determine with certainty in which
host recombination has taken place, we have strong evidence that at least two
but most probably three of the five wFex strains are the result of homologous
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recombination. Recombination might thus not be a rare and exceptional event.
This brings about the question of how a recombinant strain, that initially is
present in a single host individual, can spread through the host population?
One possibility is that recombinant strains spread by random drift. In this
case only a very small proportion of recombinant strains would ever become
fixed, because most of them would get lost when initially rare. The fact
that several recombinant strains have successfully spread would thus indicate
that recombination must occur very frequently. A second possibility is that
recombinant strains increased in frequency due to a selective advantage. One
such advantage would be an increased rate of vertical transmission. The fact
the recombination events described here are situated within the gene wsp
might be important in that respect. wsp codes for a surface protein and might
be involved in host-symbiont interactions (Werren and Bartos, 2001; Jiggins
et al., 2001). If carrying a new type of surface protein allows recombinant
strains to better escape host control, this might represent a selective advantage
for the recombinant and thus explain their spread.
Another intriguing result of this study is that the breakpoints of the re-
combination events identified fall into a stretch of less than thirty base pairs.
This suggests that the site of recombination might not be random. Regions in
the genome where the rate of recombination is very high (”recombination hot-
spots”) have been described in several species (Myers and Stahl, 1994). Re-
combination hot-spots are characterised by the presence of so-called crossover
hot-spot instigator (Chi) sequences. Chi are short sequences that trigger the
transformation of the exonuclease RecBCD into the recombinase RecBC(D−)
(Myers and Stahl, 1994; Kowalczykowski, 2000). Chi sequences are found
within regions of the genome which are rich in GT-content and facilitate the
binding of RecA, an enzyme essential for recombination in E. coli (Lao and
Forsdyke, 2000; Tracy et al., 1997). Interestingly, all our recombination events
fall into a conserved region containing a 19 base pair stretch consisting exclu-
sively of G and T.
Our RFLP analyses have shown that Wolbachia strain wFex1 systemati-
cally lacked in hosts with mitochondrial haplotypes Hap1 and Hap3 but was in
all hosts with the three other haplotypes. This result is surprising given that
the Wolbachia harboured by F. exsecta are thought to cause CI. Following
theoretical models of the dynamics of CI-inducing Wolbachia infections, host
maternal lineages lacking symbiont strains should be rapidly eradicated from
the population, because they suffer a selective disadvantage due to incompati-
ble matings (Hoffmann and Turelli, 1997). There are two possible explanations
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for how the haplotypic lineages Hap1 and Hap3 could nevertheless be main-
tained in the population. First, females lacking strain wFex1 might not suffer
incompatible matings because they do not interbreed with males carrying that
strain. This is unlikely because hosts carrying wFex1 (Hap2, Hap4, Hap6) and
those lacking it (Hap1, Hap3) can be found in the same population and even
in the same nest (Liautard and Keller, 2001). Second, the Wolbachia strain
wFex1 might not cause incompatibility. Neutral strains that neither cause CI
nor protect from it are known from Drosophila simulans (Hoffmann et al.,
1996) and D. mauritiana (Giordano et al., 1995). How these strains have
been able to invade the host population and how they are maintained remains
a puzzle (Hoffmann and Turelli, 1997). It has been suggested that neutral
strains might hitch-hike during invasion of another CI-causing Wolbachia lin-
eage (Giordano et al., 1995). Thus, wFex1 might have spread because it was
initially associated with one of the other strains which caused CI. Giordano
et al. (1995) state that once fixed, a neutral strain could maintain itself in the
host population if it was beneficial to their host. If wFex1 had no positive
effect on the host, this could explain why it has been lost in the haplotypic
lineages Hap1 and Hap3. The scenario of wFex1 spreading in association with
another CI-inducing strain and being subsequently lost in some host lineages
assumes that the Wolbachia infection is older than the divergence of host mi-
tochondrial haplotypes. Although we lack direct evidence, our data are in
agreement with this hypothesis. The clear association of strain wFex1 with
certain host mitochondrial haplotypes indicates that Wolbachia is almost ex-
clusively or always vertically transmitted. This, together with the fact that
the other four Wolbachia strains are present in hosts of all mitochondrial hap-
lotypes, indicates that mitochondrial haplotypes have most probably diverged
after Wolbachia infections had been fixed.
In conclusion, this study suggests that the infection dynamics of CI-causing
Wolbachia might be more complex than hitherto appreciated. Thus, recom-
bination in Wolbachia might occur relatively frequently. Due to our poor
understanding of Wolbachia-host interactions it is currently difficult to ap-
preciate the importance of recombination for the evolution of the symbiont
as well as the co-evolution with its host. In the future, increasing knowledge
about Wolbachia’s genome as well as the molecular basis of Wolbachia-host
interactions will allow us to more fully apprehend the role of selection and
recombination in the evolution this fascinating symbiont.
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Summary
Wolbachia bacteria are intracellular symbionts of many arthropod species.
Their spread through host populations is promoted by the drastic alterations
that they impose on host reproductive physiology. In the present study, we
analysed the association betweenWolbachia and host mitochondrial genotypes
in the ant Formica exsecta. A joint analysis of the two maternally inherited
elements allows to make inferences on the history of infection as well as the
exact mode of transmission of Wolbachia. Furthermore, F. exsecta is partic-
ular because female dispersal occurs at extremely low rates. Mitochondrial
genotypes are therefore strongly differentiated between and within popula-
tions. Our study revealed exceptionally high levels of multiple infection, with
all individual ants harbouring between four and five different symbiont strains.
Interestingly, hosts varied in the number of strains they carried, because one
Wolbachia strain was exclusively associated with three host mitochondrial
haplotypes while lacking in the two remaining mitochondrial lineages. Fur-
thermore, sequence analyses of the Wolbachia gene wsp revealed that three of
the five Wolbachia strains have probably arisen by recombination.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The results presented in this thesis illustrate the importance of multi-level
selection in the evolution of co-operation and conflict. This is particularly
clear in the first part which treats the evolution of queen-worker conflict over
sex allocation. Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate that selection at the colony
level can restrain selfish strategies, if these have a negative effect on overall
colony performance. Costs caused by the workers’ sex ratio adjustment, for
example, will select against sex ratio biasing. Consequently, sex allocation
under worker control deviates from the equilibrium predicted on the basis
of relatedness asymmetry alone. Furthermore, the degree to which queens
can counter-manipulate sex ratio biasing by workers might equally be limited
by the effect of their actions on colony productivity. Selection at the colony
level might thus prevent queens from attaining their optimal sex allocation
in the same way as it does with workers. In extension of this argument, the
existence of a compromise between workers and queens would require higher-
level selection. Only then the tug-of-war between workers and queens would be
limited by the impact that the parties’ strategies have on group productivity.
Chapters 2 and 3 also stress the importance of including proximate mech-
anisms into sex ratio theory. The vast majority of models on optimal sex
allocation in eusocial Hymenoptera have focused on genetic relatedness as the
sole factor driving the evolution of colony investment. These models have
been of great importance in identifying queen-worker conflict and generating
predictions on optimal sex allocation for a wide range of mating systems and
population structures. Furthermore, they have triggered a large number of
empirical studies on colony sex ratios. These studies could often qualitatively
confirm the predictions made, but much variance remains unexplained. At
this stage, introducing proximate aspects of queen-worker conflict in sex ra-
tio theory seems of great importance for three reasons. First, refined models
including proximate mechanisms and the costs they entail can contribute to
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resolve the residual variance in sex allocation that we observe between species,
populations, or colonies (Chapter 2). Second, thinking about proximate mech-
anisms will allow us to identify the possibilities that the two parties actually
have to influence colony investment. Only if we have identified these, we will
be able to predict the outcome of conflict. Third, identifying the proximate
mechanisms of sex ratio biasing allows us to relate genetic conflict to the ba-
sic biology of social insect species. Chapter 3 demonstrates this by linking
the conflict between queens, workers, and female larvae to colony growth, a
fundamental aspect of life-history.
The second part of this thesis has provided some insight in the association
between Wolbachia symbionts and their ant host Formica exsecta — even if
the two studies conducted so far have provoked more questions than they have
answered. Chapter 4 tempted to determine the effect of Wolbachia on its host
by testing whether the presence of the symbiont was associated with varia-
tions in colony sex allocation. Because Wolbachia are maternally transmitted,
we expected the prevalence of Wolbachia infection to be higher in colonies
which produced females than in those which did not. This was not the case.
The question what Wolbachia does in Formica exsecta remains therefore unre-
solved. Assuming that the symbionts’ effects on the host are restricted to those
observed in other arthropod hosts, we can by exclusion identify cytoplasmic
incompatibility (CI) as the most probable phenotype. All other phenotypes —
male-killing, parthenogenesis induction, and feminisation — should have re-
sulted in an association between prevalence of Wolbachia infection and colony
sex ratio. The hypothesis of CI as the most probable phenotype is corrobo-
rated by the finding that F. exsecta harbours multiple symbiont strains, which
so far has only be observed in host-symbiont associations expressing CI (Chap-
ter 5). However, crossing experiments are needed to confirm the hypothesis
of a CI phenotype. CI would be supported by observing infertility in matings
between males carrying all Wolbachia strains and females that lack some of
them, for example due to incomplete maternal transmission.
Crossing experiments could also elucidate the interesting finding that Wol-
bachia strain wFex1 is associated with some host mitochondrial haplotype but
not others. Under the assumption that theWolbachia harboured by F. exsecta
cause CI and for reasons outlined in Chapter 5, the variations in infection be-
tween host haplotypic lineages suggest that this Wolbachia strain causes only
weak or no CI. It could therefore have been lost in two maternal lineages
without these hosts suffering significant losses due to incompatibility. Con-
ducting crosses between females lacking wFex1 and males carrying it would
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allow to verify this scenario. If wFex1 does effectively not cause CI, these
crosses should be as fecund as crosses between pairs of ants carrying the same
Wolbachia strains. Taken together, the results of the two crossing experi-
ments could also permit to make inferences about conflict between host and
Wolbachia. Confirming that wFex1 does not cause CI while the other strains
(fixed in the host population) do, we could conclude that conflict is probably
absent, because all possible matings are compatible and Wolbachia therefore
does not interfere with host reproduction. Wolbachia thus would not cause
any fitness loss in the host.
Finally, the study presented in Chapter 5 revealed that three of the five
Wolbachia strains harboured by F. exsecta were the product of homologous
recombination. The discovery that Wolbachia symbionts recombine is very
recent (Werren and Bartos, 2001; Jiggins et al., 2001) and very little is known
about the importance of this phenomenon for the evolution of the symbiont
and its interactions with the host. This raises three questions. First, how fre-
quent is recombination? Detailed phylogenetic studies aiming at identifying
potential recombinant strains could provide information on this point. Per-
forming these analyses on several genes independently could answer a second
question, whether recombination occurs uniformly over the whole Wolbachia
genome or whether it is restricted to certain genes or regions of the genome. It
has been hypothesised that recombination might be of particular importance
in genes involved in host-symbiont interactions, such as the gene wsp used
in Chapter 5 (Werren and Bartos, 2001; Jiggins et al., 2001). New genetic
variants emerging through gene exchange between Wolbachia lineages would
perhaps be better able to escape host control and manipulation. If this was
true, one would expect to find a dis-proportionally high rate of recombination
in the gene wsp. This gene codes for a surface protein and has therefore been
hypothesised to play an important role in host-symbiont interactions (Werren
and Bartos, 2001; Jiggins et al., 2001; von der Schulenburg et al., 2000). Fi-
nally, correlating the number of recombinants identified in a certain gene with
the GT-content of that genes might give some information about the control
of recombination. An association between recombination rate and GT-content
would hint towards a possible role of Chi -sequences in the control of recom-
bination, because Chi appears to be situated in GT-rich islands (Lao and
Forsdyke, 2000; Tracy et al., 1997).
As an overall conclusion, by the variety of its topics and approaches this
thesis has perhaps not given a cohesive and conclusive analysis of conflict in
animal societies. Nevertheless, it may have deepened our understanding of the
70 Chapter 6. Conclusion
functioning of biological alliances. It has done so by making contributions to
both fields that it englobed, the analysis of hymenopteran sex ratio conflict
and the study of Wolbachia-host associations. The contribution to the first
field consists in introducing a more mechanistic perspective in sex ratio theory,
which allows for more comprehensive analysis of the evolution of sex allocation
but also approaches theory more to the biology of Hymenopteran species. The
contribution to the study of Wolbachia consisted in the identification of a
number of interesting phenomena, the detailed study of which will shed some
light on the evolutionary processes that govern the dynamics of Wolbachia
infections as well as the evolution of the symbiont and its interactions with
the host.
Abstract / Re´sume´
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Abstract
The present work investigates the interaction between members of animal
associations. Two examples are studied, insect societies and the association
between the ant Formica exsecta and its intracellular symbiont Wolbachia.
Both associations are characterised by the co-existence of co-operation and
conflict.
Social insect colonies are a prime example of co-operation. Nevertheless,
queens and workers are in disagreement over a number of reproductive pa-
rameters. Conflict over sex allocation has probably found the most attention.
Due to relatedness asymmetries brought about by the haplodiploid system
of sex determination, queens favour an even investment in male and female
sexuals whereas workers prefer a female-biased investment. Sex-ratio conflict
has been extensively studied from a theoretical point of view. So far, however,
most models were based on relatedness asymmetry alone. The first part of
this thesis (Chapters 1 and 2) introduces the proximate mechanisms by which
workers and queens manipulate sex allocation into models of optimal sex allo-
cation. It is shown that proximate mechanisms, due to their negative effects
on colony productivity, can cause sex allocation to deviate significantly from
the predictions made by classical models. Furthermore, the consideration of
proximate mechanisms allows to investigate how the opposing parties are se-
lected to gain power over colony investment. Finally, the models provide a
prediction on the outcome of conflict, i.e., a compromise at which queens and
workers share control of investment.
The second part of this thesis investigates a Wolbachia infection in the ant
Formica exsecta. Wolbachia are maternally inherited cytoplasmic symbionts of
many arthropod species. They alter the host’s reproductive physiology in or-
der to promote their spread through the host population. Chapter 3 describes
a study that attempts to relate the presence or absence of Wolbachia to the
sex ratio produced by ant colonies. Chapter 4 investigates the association be-
tween mitochondrial haplotypes of hosts and the Wolbachia strains they carry.
A Swiss population of F. exsecta is of particular interest for studying the as-
sociation between the two maternally inherited elements, because low rates
of queen dispersal result in a strong mitochondrial genetic structure between
and within ant populations.
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Re´sume´
Cette the`se se propose d’e´tudier les forces e´volutives qui influencent la bal-
ance entre coope´ration et conflit. Deux exemples sont analyse´s en de´tail, les
socie´te´s d’insectes et l’association entre la fourmi Formica exsecta et son sym-
bionte intracellulaire Wolbachia. Chacune de ces deux associations animales
est caracte´rise´e par la coexistence de coope´ration et de conflit.
Les colonies d’insectes sociaux sont un exemple typique de coope´ration.
Ne´anmoins, la de´termination haplodiplo¨ıde du sexe cre´e des apparentements
asyme´triques entre les membres de la colonie qui se traduisent par des con-
flits entre reines et ouvrie`res. Un des conflits les plus importants porte sur le
sexe-ratio, l’investissement optimal en sexue´s males et femelles e´tant e´quilibre´
pour la reine, mais biaise´ en faveur des femelles pour les ouvrie`res. Jusqu’ici,
les mode`les e´tudiant ce conflit se basaient uniquement sur les asyme´tries d’ap-
parentement. La premie`re partie de cette the`se (Chapitres 1 et 2) propose
d’introduire dans des mode`les de sexe-ratio les me´canismes proximaux utilise´s
par les deux parties pour influencer le sexe-ratio. Ces me´canismes, par leurs ef-
fets ne´gatifs sur la productivite´ de la colonie, peuvent entraˆıner des de´viations
importantes du sexe-ratio par rapport a` la valeur pre´dite par des mode`les clas-
siques. De plus, la prise en compte de ces me´canismes nous permet d’e´tudier
dans quelle mesure les parties oppose´es sont se´lectionne´es pour influencer le
sexe-ratio. Enfin, les mode`les ge´ne`rent des pre´dictions quant a` l’issue du con-
flit, c’est-a`-dire un compromis ou` reines et ouvrie`res partagent le controˆle de
l’investissement.
La seconde partie du travail porte sur l’infection de la fourmi Formica ex-
secta par le symbionte cytoplasmique Wolbachia. Ce symbionte, pre´sent chez
un grand nombre d’espe`ces d’Arthropodes, est transmis maternellement. Afin
de se re´pandre dans la population d’hoˆtes, Wolbachia manipule la physiolo-
gie reproductive de l’organisme qui l’abrite. Le Chapitre 3 de´crit une e´tude
consacre´e aux variations du sexe-ratio produit dans des colonies de fourmis en
fonction de la pre´sence ou de l’absence de Wolbachia. Le Chapitre 4 e´tudie
l’association entre les ligne´es du symbionte et les haplotypes mitochondriaux
des hoˆtes. L’e´tude de l’association entre les deux e´le´ments maternellement
transmis est d’un inte´reˆt particulier chez Formica exsecta car le taux de migra-
tion femelle tre`s faible engendre une forte strucure ge´ne´tique mitochondriale.

Bibliography
Aron, S., L. Passera, and L. Keller (1999). Evolution of social parasitism
in ants: size of sexuals, sex ratio and mechanisms of caste determination.
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London - Series B: Biological Sciences
266(1415):173–177.
Backus, V. L. and J. M. Herbers (1992). Sexual allocation ratios in forest ants:
food limitation does not explain observed patterns. Behavioral Ecology and
Sociobiology 30:425–429.
Boomsma, J. J. (1989). Sex-investment ratios in ants: has female bias been
systematically overestimated? American Naturalist 133:517–532.
Boomsma, J. J. and A. Grafen (1990). Intraspecific variation in ant sex ratios
and the Trivers-Hare hypothesis. Evolution 44:1026–1034.
Boomsma, J. J. and A. Grafen (1991). Colony-level sex ratio selection in the
eusocial Hymenoptera. Journal of Evolutionary Biology 3:383–407.
Boomsma, J. J., G. A. Van der Lee, and T. M. Van der Have (1982). On the
production ecology of Lasius niger (Hymenoptera: Formicidae). Journal of
Animal Ecology 51:975–991.
Boomsma, J. J., L. Keller, and M. G. Nielsen (1995). A comparative analysis of
sex ratio investment parameters in ants. Functional Ecology 9(5)):743–753.
Boomsma, J. J., E. J. Fjerdingstad, and J. Frydenberg (1999). Multiple pa-
ternity, relatedness and genetic diversity in Acromyrmex leaf-cutter ants.
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London - Series B: Biological Sciences
266(1416):249–254.
Bourke, A. F. G. (1997). Sociality and kin selection in insects. In Krebs, J. R.
and N. B. Davies, editors, Behavioural Ecology. An Evolutionary Approach.
Fourth edition, pages 203–227. Blackwell, Oxford.
75
76 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bourke, A. F. G. (1999). Colony size, social complexity and reproductive
conflict in social insects. Journal of Evolutionary Biology 12:245–257.
Bourke, A. F. G. and G. L. Chan (1999). Queen-worker conflict over sexual
production and colony maintenance. American Naturalist 154(4):417–426.
Bourke, A. F. G. and N. R. Franks (1995). Social evolution in ants. Princeton
University Press, Princeton.
Bourke, A. F. G. and F. L. W. Ratnieks (1999). Kin conflict over caste de-
termination in social Hymenoptera. Behavioural Ecology and Sociobiology
46:287–197.
Braig, H. R., W. G. Zhou, S. L. Dobson, and S. L. Oneill (1998). Cloning
and Characterization of a Gene Encoding the Major Surface Protein of
the Bacterial Endosymbiont Wolbachia Pipientis. Journal of Bacteriology
180(9):2373–2378.
Breeuwer, J. A. J. and J. H. Werren (1990). Cytoplasmic incompatibility and
bacterial density in Nasonia vitripens. Genetics 135:565–574.
Breeuwer, J. A. J., R. Stouthamer, S. M. Barns, D. A. Pelletier, W. G. Weis-
burg, and J. H. Werren (1992). Phylogeny of cytoplasmic incompatibility
micro-organisms in the parasitoid wasp Nasonia (Hymenoptera: Pteromali-
dae) based on ribosomal DNA sequences. Insect Molecular Biology 1(1):25–
36.
Brian, M. V. (1956). Group form and the cause of working inefficiency in the
ant Myrmica rubra L. Physiological Zoology 29:173–194.
Brian, M. V. (1979). Habitat differences in sexual production by two co-
existent ants. Anim Ecol 48:943–953.
Brian, M. V. (1980). Social control over sex and caste in bees, wasps and ants.
Biological Reviews 55:379–415.
Brian, M. V. (1983). Social Insects: Ecology and Behavioural biology. Chap-
man and Hall, London.
Brown, W. D. and L. Keller (2000). Colony sex ratios vary with queen number
but not relatedness asymmetry in the ant Formica exsecta. Proceedings of
the Royal Society of London - Series B: Biological Sciences 267:1751–1757.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 77
Bulmer, M. and P. D. Taylor (1981). Worker-queen conflict and sex ratio
theory in social Hymenoptera. Heredity 47:197–207.
Caspari, E. and G. S. Watson (1959). On the evolutionary importance of
cytoplasmic sterility in mosquitoes. Evolution 13:568–570.
Chapuisat, M. and L. Keller (1999). Testing kin selection with sex allocation
data in eusocial Hymenoptera. Heredity. 82(Part 5):473–478.
Chapuisat, M., L. Sundstro¨m, and L. Keller (1997). Sex-ratio regulation - the
economics of fratricide in ants. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London
- Series B: Biological Sciences 264(1385):1255–1260.
Charnov, E. L. (1978). Sex-ratio selection in eusocial Hymenoptera. American
Naturalist 112:317–326.
Clark, A. B. (1978). Sex ratio and local ressource competition in a prosimian
primate. Science 201:163–165.
Cook, J. and R. H. Crozier (1995). Sex determination and population biology
in the Hymenoptera. Trends in Ecology and Evolution 10:281–286.
Cook, J. M. and R. D. J. Butcher (1999). The transmission and effects of Wol-
bachia bacteria in parasitoids. Researches on Population Ecology 41(1):15–
28.
Crozier, R. H. and P. Pamilo (1993). Sex allocation in social insects: problems
in prediction and estimation. In Wrensch, D. L. and M. Ebberts, editors,
Evolution and Diversity of Sex Ratio in Insects and Mites, pages 369–383.
Chapman and Hall, New York.
Crozier, R. H. and P. Pamilo (1996). Evolution of social insect colonies. Sex
allocation and kin-selection. Oxford Universty Press, Oxford.
Deslippe, R. J. and R. Savolainen (1995). Sex investment in a social insect -
the proximate role of food. Ecology 76(2)):375–382.
Douglas, A. E. (1996). The biology of symbiotic micro-organisms. Advances
in Ecological Research 26:69–103.
Elmes, G. W. (1987). Temporal variation in colony populations of the ant
Myrmica sulcinodis. 2. Sexual production and sex ratios. Journal of Animal
Ecology 56:573–583.
78 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Falconer, D. S. and T. C. F. Mackay (1996). Introduction to quantitative
genetics. Longman, London, 4rth edition.
Fjerdingstad, E. J., P. J. Gertsch, and L. Keller (2002). Why do some social
insect queens mate with several males? Testing the sex-ratio manipulation
hypothesis in Lasius niger. Ecolution 56:553–562.
Fletcher, D. J. C. (1986). Triple action of queen pheromones in the regulation
of reproduction in fire ant (Solenopsis invicta) colonies. In Porchet, M., J.-C.
Andries, and A. Dhaiant, editors, Advances in Invertebrate Reproduction,
volume 4, pages 305–316. Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Fletcher, D. J. C. and K. G. Ross (1985). Regulation of reproduction in
eusocial Hymenoptera. Annual Review of Entomology 30:319–343.
Frank, S. A. (1987). Variable sex ratio among colonies of ants. Behavioral
Ecology and Sociobiology 20:195–201.
Frank, S. A. (1998). Foundations of social evolution. Princeton University
Press, Princeton NJ.
Giordano, R., S. L. Oneill, and H. M. Robertson (1995). Wolbachia Infections
and the Expression of Cytoplasmic Incompatibility in Drosophila Sechellia
and D-Mauritiana. Genetics 140(4):1307–1317.
Grafen, A. (1986). Split sex ratio and the evolutionary origin of eusociality.
Journal of Theoretical Biology 122:95–121.
Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behaviour. II. Jour-
nal of Theoretical Biology 7:17–52.
Hamilton, W. D. (1967). Extraordinary sex ratios. Science 156:477–488.
Hammond, R. L., M. W. Bruford, and A. F. G. Bourke (2002). Ant workers
selfishly bias sex ratios by manipulating female development. Proceedings
of the Royal Society of London - Series B: Biological Sciences 269:173–178.
Hasegawa, M., H. Kishino, and T. A. Yano (1985). Dating of the Human Ape
Splitting by a Molecular Clock of Mitochondrial-DNA. Journal of Molecular
Evolution 22(2):160–174.
Helms, K. R. (1999). Colony sex ratios, conflict between queens and work-
ers, and apparent queen control in the ant Pheidole desertorum. Evolution
53(5):1470–1478.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 79
Herbers, J. M. (1990). Reproductive investment and allocation ratios for the
ant Leptothorax longispinosus: sorting out the variation. American Natu-
ralist 136:178–208.
Herre, E. A., N. Knowlton, U. G. Mueller, and S. A. Rehner (1999). The evo-
lution of mutualisms: exploring the paths between conflict and cooperation.
Trends in Ecology and Evolution 14(2):49–53.
Hoffmann, A. A. and M. Turelli (1997). Cytoplasmic incompatibility in insects.
In O’Neill, S. L., A. A. Hoffmann, and J. H. Werren, editors, Influential
Passengers, pages 42–80. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Hoffmann, A. A., D. Clancy, and J. Duncan (1996). Naturally-Occurring Wol-
bachia Infection in Drosophila Simulans That Does Not Cause Cytoplasmic
Incompatibility. Heredity 76:1–8.
Ho¨lldobler, B. and S. Bartz (1985). Sociobiology of reproduction in ants. In
Ho¨lldobler, B. and M. Lindauer, editors, Experimental Behavioral Ecology
and Sociobiology, volume 31, pages 237–257. G. Fischer Verlag, Stuttgart.
Holmes, E. C., M. Worobey, and A. Rambaut (1999). Phylogenetic evidence for
recombination in dengue virus. Molecular Biology and Evolution 16(3):405–
409.
Hurst, G. D. D., F. M. Jiggins, J. H. G. von der Schulenburg, D. Bertrand,
S. A. West, I. Goriacheva, I. A. Zakharov, J. H. Werren, R. Stouthamer, and
M. E. N. Majerus (1999). Male-killing Wolbachia in two species of insect.
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London - Series B: Biological Sciences
266(1420):735–740.
Hurst, G. D. D., A. P. Johnson, J. H. G. von der Schulenburg, and Y. Fuyama
(2000). Male-killing Wolbachia in Drosophila: A temperature-sensitive trait
with a threshold bacterial density. Genetics 156:699–709.
Jiggins, F. M., J. H. G. von der Schulenburg, G. D. D. Hurst, and M. E. N.
Majerus (2001). Recombination confounds interpretations of Wolbachia evo-
lution. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series B-Biological Sci-
ences 268(1474):1423–1427.
Keller, L. and M. Chapuisat (1999). Cooperation among selfish individuals in
insect societies. BioScience 49:899–909.
80 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Keller, L. and P. Nonacs (1993). The role of queen pheromones in colonies of
social insects: Queen control or queen signal? Animal Behaviour 45:787–
794.
Keller, L. and H. K. Reeve (1999). Dynamics of conflicts within insect societies.
In Keller, L., editor, Levels of Selection in Evolution. Princeton University
Press, Princeton.
Kondo, N., N. Ijichi, M. Shimada, and T. Fukatsu (2002). Prevailing triple
infection with Wolbachia in Callosobruchus chinensis (Coleoptera : Bruchi-
dae). Molecular Ecology 11(2):167–180.
Kowalczykowski, S. C. (2000). Initiation of genetic recombination and
recombination-dependent replication. Trends in Biochemical Sciences
25(4):156–165.
Lande, R. and S. J. Arnold (1983). The measurement of selection on correlated
characters. Evolution 37(6):1210–1226.
Lao, P. J. and D. R. Forsdyke (2000). Crossover hot-spot instigator (Chi)
sequences in Escherichia coli occupy distinct recombination/transcription
islands. Gene 243(1-2):47–57.
Lassy, C. W. and T. L. Karr (1996). Cytological Analysis of Fertilization
and Early Embryonic Development in Incompatible Crosses of Drosophila
Simulans. Mechanisms of Development 57(1):47–58.
Leigh, E. G. (1977). How Does Selection Reconcile Individual Advantage with
Good of Group. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America 74(10):4542–4546.
Liautard, C. and L. Keller (2001). Restricted effective queen dispersal at a
microgeographic scale in polygynous populations of the ant Formica exsecta.
Evolution 55:2484–2492.
Matessi, C. and I. Eshel (1992). Sex ratio in the social Hymenoptera: a
population-genetics study of long-term evolution. American Naturalist
139:276–312.
Maynard Smith, J. and E. Szathmary (1995). The major transitions in evo-
lution. Freeman, Oxford.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 81
Merc¸ot, H., B. Llorente, M. Jacques, A. Atlan, and C. Montchamp-Moreau
(1995). Variability Within the Seychelles Cytoplasmic Incompatibility Sys-
tem in Drosophila Simulans. Genetics 141(3):1015–1023.
Michener, C. D. (1974). The social behavior of bees: a comparative study.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Myers, R. S. and F. W. Stahl (1994). Chi and the Recbcd Enzyme of
Escherichia-Coli. Annual Review of Genetics 28:49–70.
Nonacs, P. (1986). Ant reproductive strategies and sex allocation theory.
Quarterly Review of Biology 61:1–21.
Nonacs, P. (1993). Male parentage and sexual deception in the social Hy-
menoptera. In Wrensch, D. L. and M. Ebberts, editors, Evolution and
diversity of sex ratio in insects and mites, pages 384–401. Chapman and
Hall, New York.
Nonacs, P. and N. F. Carlin (1990). When can ants discriminate the sex of
brood ? A new aspect of queen-worker conflict. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 87:9670–9673.
Nonacs, P. and J. Tobin (1992). Selfish larvae: development and the evolution
of parasitic behavior in the Hymenoptera. Evolution 46:1605–1620.
O’Neill, S. L., R. Giordano, A. M. E. Colbert, T. L. Karr, and H. M. Robertson
(1992). 16s rRNA Phylogenetic Analysis of the Bacterial Endosymbionts
Associated with Cytoplasmic Incompatibility in Insects. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 89(7):2699–
2702.
Ortius, D. and J. Heinze (1999). Fertility signaling in queens of a North
American ant. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 45:151–159.
Pamilo, P. (1990). Sex allocation and queen-worker conflict in polygynous
ants. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 27:31–36.
Pamilo, P. (1991). Evolution of colony characteristics in social insects. 1. Sex
allocation. American Naturalist 137:83–107.
Passera, L. (1980). La ponte d’oeufs pre´oriente´s chez la fourmi Pheidole pal-
lidula (Nyl.) (Hymenoptera: Formicidae). Insectes Sociaux 27:79–95.
82 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Pettis, J. S., H. A. Higo, T. Pankiw, and M. L. Winston (1997). Queen rearing
suppression in the honey bee - evidence for a fecundity signal. Insectes
Sociaux 44:311–322.
Queller, D. C. (1992). Does population viscosity promote kin selection? Trends
in Ecology and Evolution 7:322–324.
Queller, D. C. (2000). Relatedness and the fraternal major transitions. Philo-
sophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B-Biological
Sciences 355(1403):1647–1655.
Queller, D. C. and J. E. Strassmann (1998). Kin selection and social insects.
Bioscience 48(3):165–175.
Rambaut, A. and N. C. Grassly (1997). Seq-Gen: An application for the
Monte Carlo simulation of DNA sequence evolution along phylogenetic frees.
Computer Applications in the Biosciences 13(3):235–238.
Ratnieks, F. L. W. and H. K. Reeve (1992). Conflict in single-queen hy-
menopteran societies: the structure of conflict and processes that reduce
conflict in advanced eusocial species. Journal of Theoretical Biology 158:33–
65.
Rigaud, T., C. Soutygrosset, R. Raimond, J. P. Mocquard, and P. Juchault
(1991). Feminizing Endocytobiosis in the Terrestrial Crustacean
Armadillidium-Vulgare Latr (Isopoda) - Recent Acquisitions. Endocyto-
biosis and Cell Research 7(3):259–273.
Rosenheim, J. A., P. Nonacs, and M. Mangel (1996). Sex ratios and multi-
faceted parental invesment. American Naturalist 148(3):501–535.
Rousset, F., D. Vautrin, and M. Solignac (1992a). Molecular Identification
of Wolbachia, the Agent of Cytoplasmic Incompatibility in Drosophila sim-
ulans, and Variability in Relation with Host Mitochondrial Types. Pro-
ceedings of the Royal Society of London - Series B: Biological Sciences
247(1320):163–168.
Rousset, F., D. Bouchon, B. Pintureau, P. Juchault, and M. Solignac (1992b).
Wolbachia Endosymbionts Responsible for Various Alterations of Sexual-
ity in Arthropods. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series B-
Biological Sciences 250(1328):91–98.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 83
Sinkins, S. P., H. R. Braig, and S. L. Oneill (1995). Wolbachia Superinfections
and the Expression of Cytoplasmic Incompatibility. Proceedings of the Royal
Society of London - Series B: Biological Sciences 261(1362):325–330.
Skinner, S. W. (1982). Maternally inherited sex-ratio in the parasitoid wasp
Nasonia vitripennis. Science 215(4536):1133–1134.
Stearns, S. C. (1992). The evolution of life histories. Oxford University Press,
Oxford.
Stouthamer, R. and D. Kazmer (1994). Cytogenetics of microbe-associated
parthenogenesis and its consequences for gene flow in Trichogramma wasps.
Heredity 73:317–327.
Stouthamer, R., J. A. J. Breeuwer, R. F. Luck, and J. H. Werren (1993).
Molecular-Identification of Microorganisms Associated with Parthenogene-
sis. Nature 361(6407):66–68.
Sundstro¨m, L. (1994). Sex ratio bias, relatedness asymmetry and queen mating
frequency in ants. Nature 367:266–268.
Sundstro¨m, L. (1995). Sex allocation and colony maintenance in monogyne and
polygyne colonies of Formica truncorum (Hymenoptera, Formicidae) - the
impact of kinship and mating structure. American Naturalist 146(2):182–
201.
Sundstro¨m, L. and F. L. W. Ratnieks (1998). Sex ratio conflicts, mating
frequency, and queen fitness in the ant Formica truncorum. Behavioral
Ecology 9(2):116–121.
Sundstro¨m, L., M. Chapuisat, and L. Keller (1996). Conditional manipula-
tion of sex ratios by ant workers - a test of kin selection theory. Science
274(5289):993–995.
Taylor, P. D. and S. A. Frank (1996). How to Make a Kin Selection Model.
Journal of Theoretical Biology 180(1):27–37.
Tracy, R. B., F. Chedin, and S. C. Kowalczykowski (1997). The recombination
hot spot chi is embedded within islands of preferred DNA pairing sequences
in the E-coli genome. Cell 90(2):205–206.
Trivers, R. L. and H. Hare (1976). Haplodiploidy and the evolution of the
social insects. Science 191:249–263.
84 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Tschinkel, W. R. (1993). Sociometry and sociogenesis of colonies of the fire ant
Solenopsis invicta during one annual cycle. Ecological Monographs 63:427–
457.
Turelli, M. (1994). Evolution of Incompatibility-Inducing Microbes and Their
Hosts. Evolution 48(5):1500–1513.
Turelli, M. and A. A. Hoffmann (1991). Rapid Spread of an Inherited Incom-
patibility Factor in California Drosophila. Nature 353(6343):440–442.
Turelli, M. and A. A. Hoffmann (1995). Cytoplasmic Incompatibility in
Drosophila Simulans: Dynamics and Parameter Estimates From Natural
Populations. Genetics 140(4):1319–1338.
Turelli, M., A. A. Hoffmann, and S. W. McKechnie (1992). Dynamics of
Cytoplasmic Incompatibility and mtDNA Variation in Natural Drosophila
simulans Populations. Genetics 132(3):713–723.
van der Have, T. M., J. J. Boomsma, and S. B. J. Menken (1988). Sex-
investment ratios and relatedness in the monogynous ant Lasius niger (L.).
Evolution 42:160–172.
Vargo, E. L. and L. Passera (1991). Pheromonal and behavioral queen control
over the production of gynes in the Argentine ant Iridomyrmex humilis
(Mayr). Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 28:161–169.
Vavre, F., F. Fleury, D. Lepetit, P. Fouillet, and M. Bouletreau (1999). Phylo-
genetic evidence for horizontal transmission of Wolbachia in host-parasitoid
associations. Molecular Biology and Evolution 16(12):1711–1723.
Vavre, F., F. Fleury, J. Varaldi, P. Fouillet, and M. Bouletreau (2000). Ev-
idence for female mortality in Wolbachia-mediated cytoplasmic incompati-
bility in haplodiploid insects: Epidemiologic and evolutionary consequences.
Evolution 54(1):191–200.
von der Schulenburg, J. H. G., G. D. D. Hurst, T. M. E. Huigens, M. M. M. van
Meer, F. M. Jiggins, and M. E. N. Majerus (2000). Molecular evolution and
phylogenetic utility of Wolbachia ftsZ and wsp gene sequences with special
reference to the origin of male-killing. Molecular Biology and Evolution
17(4):584–600.
Wenseleers, T. and J. Billen (2000). No evidence for Wolbachia-induced
parthenogenesis in the social Hymenoptera. Journal of Evolutionary Bi-
ology 13(2):277–280.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 85
Wenseleers, T., F. Ito, S. Vanborm, R. Huybrechts, F. Volckaert, and J. Billen
(1998). Widespread Occurrence of the Micro-Organism Wolbachia in Ants.
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London - Series B: Biological Sciences
265(1404):1447–1452.
Wenseleers, T., L. Sundstrom, and J. Billen (2002). Deleterious Wolbachia in
the ant Formica truncorum. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London -
Series B: Biological Sciences 269(1441):623–629.
Werren, J. H. (1997). Biology of Wolbachia. Annual Review of Entomology
42:587–609.
Werren, J. H. and J. D. Bartos (2001). Recombination in Wolbachia. Current
Biology 11(6):431–435.
Werren, J. H. and S. L. O’Neill (1997). The evolution of heritable symbionts.
In O’Neill, S. L., A. A. Hoffmann, and J. H. Werren, editors, Influential
Passengers, pages 1–41. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Werren, J. H., D. Windsor, and L. R. Guo (1995a). Distribution of Wolbachia
Among Neotropical Arthropods. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London
- Series B: Biological Sciences 262(1364):197–204.
Werren, J. H., W. Zhang, and L. R. Guo (1995b). Evolution and Phylogeny of
Wolbachia: Reproductive Parasites of Arthropods. Proceedings of the Royal
Society of London - Series B: Biological Sciences 261(1360):55–63.
Wheeler, D. E. (1986). Developmental and physiological determinants of caste
in social Hymenoptera: evolutionary implications. American Naturalist
128:13–34.
Zhou, W. G., F. Rousset, and S. Oneill (1998). Phylogeny and PCR-based
Classification Of Wolbachia Strains Using wsp Gene Sequences. Pro-
ceedings of the Royal Society of London - Series B: Biological Sciences
265(1395):509–515.
